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Recovering the Social Value of
Jurisdictional Redundancy
Alexandra D. Lahav*
Tis Article presents the case for pluralism in litigaton. Pluralism, in the form of
jurisdictional redundancy, is embedded in our federalist system and our preference for
adveraarial adjudication. Judges and scholars should take more seriously the social benefits of
multicentered litigation. These benefits include avoiding error, limiting the deleterious effects of
private interests on the judicial system, and encouraging innovation. In furtherance of this goal,
theArtcle proposes a thie -factor test thatjudges and policy makers consider in determining the
level of centralization appropnate in a given case: (1) the extent and nature of underlying
substantive disagreement, (2) the costs of inconsistency, and (3) the role of political power in the
litigation. The questions judges, legislators, and scholars should ask is not only how much
pluralism our system of adjudication can tolerate, but also how much uniformity we should
expect in a pluralist society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a preoccupation with centralization in civil procedure.'
The overlap of multiple state and federal lawsuits is largely lamented
as a source of inefficiency and an opportunity for unprincipled
manipulation. The articulated basis for diversity jurisdiction, fear of
bias from local courts, is considered weak in a nation that has become
more and more culturally and economically homogenous. National
litigation thrives. The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) federalized
what would have been state-court class actions in an attempt to
centralize power over them.2 Large-scale settlements of nationwide
lawsuits against manufacturers continue to appear in the headlines.3
The American Law Institute's (ALI) draft Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Ligadon favors more centralization mechanisms in
aggregate litigation.' Scholars propose that courts jettison the Ene
doctrine or the Klaxon rule and develop national law for suits arising
out of conduct in national markets.!
The pluralist values advanced by jurisdictional redundancy have
been largely compromised in the attempt to resolve the troubling
problems posed by aggregate litigation. We have too quickly adopted
the now-dominant view favoring centralization. It is time to refocus on
the social value of the multiple centers of authority that jurisdictional
redundancy permits. This Article presents the case for multicentered
1. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigaton, "54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
6(1991).
2. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said To Agree To Pay $4.85 Billion for Vioxx
Claims, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 9 2007, at Al.
4. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2006)
(Discussion Draft).
5. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law:
Choice of Law Alter the Class Action Fairness Act 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1839, 1840 (2006)
(propounding a "goods on the national market" theory of choice of law). For a contrary view,
see Linda S. Mullenix, Gridlaw: The Enduring Legacy of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
74 UMKC L. REv. 651, 654-55 (2006) (arguing that choice of law remains a substantial
barrier to all class actions and aggregations).
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litigation with particular focus on the potential uses of the Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL) Acte to realize pluralist values.
This Article makes both descriptive and normative claims in
favor of multicentered litigation. The description of the current
litigation landscape reminds us that disputes continue to appear in
multiple, parallel, and competing forums. This is not news. Multiple
centers of authority are embedded in the structure of our federalism.
Our dual court system may even be said to encourage overlapping
centers of decision-making power. It is particularly important to
remember this political fact as the emphasis on centralization becomes
more entrenched in procedural doctrine and jurisdictional mandates.
Furthermore, coordination rules within our federalist system have the
potential to tilt in different directions: in favor of centralization or
against it and in favor of the state or federal judicial systems. For
example, the MDL Act favors centralization of federal cases, at least in
the pretrial phase.' CAFA federalized class actions and permitted
MDL transfer of cases removed to federal courts when these cases are
certified or sought to be certified as class actions under Rule 23.8 The
Full Faith and Credit Act,9 on the other hand, favors state judgments,
and the Eid doctrine and Klaxon" rule favor state laws.
The normative claim advanced here is that multiple centers of
adjudication offer benefits that proceduralists should take more
seriously. This Article reconsiders Robert Cover's thesis on the uses of
jurisdictional redundancy in light of nearly thirty years of significant
developments in procedure and jurisdiction. 12 In the process, it calls
into question some of the assumptions embedded in the current focus
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
7. Id.; see Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Distn'cting in Mass Tort
Litiation: An Empiical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 897 (2001) (presenting
empirical data showing that approximately two-thirds of motions for transfer under the MDL
statute are granted and that "during the 1990s, the panel granted almost three-quarters of the
motions for transfer in mass product defect cases that came before it, although in the previous
decade it has only granted about one-third of these motions").
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(C)(i) (Supp. V 2005) provides that mass actions
removed under § 1332(d)(11) shall not be transferred pursuant to § 1407. If the cases are
certified under Rule 23 or the plaintiffs request certification, the bar on multidistrict transfer
will not apply. Id. § 1332(d)(1 1)(C)(ii).
9. Full Faith & Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (holding that state law
governs cases heard under the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction).
11. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1942) (holding that a
federal court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which it sits).
12. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses offurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
andInnovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 642-43 (1981).
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on centralization. I do not suggest that we ought to resign ourselves to
needless and wasteful repetition. The claim here is that jurisdictional
redundancy is not merely repetitive. In formulating measures for
reform of our judicial systems we should consider the ability of
multiple centers of adjudication to encourage socially beneficial
institutional conflict and plural conceptions of the good.
To understand the concept of multicentered litigation, it is helpful
to distinguish it from two other concepts: atomization and polycentric
disputes. Atomization is the central quality of a system that requires
complete individuation of lawsuits. It is an ideal based on the
individual right to be heard and participate in a process that leads to
the resolution of a lawsuit. This ideal remains strong in theory if not in
practice.'" The most familiar antithesis of atomized litigation is the
class action. Atomized litigation can exist within a decentralized
system, a multicentered system, or a centralized one as long as cases
are not resolved on an aggregate basis." Likewise, a multicentered
approach to litigation does not require that each suit be tried
individually; neither does it require collective litigation.'"
The second useful distinction is between polycentric disputes, a
term used by Lon Fuller to describe disputes he thought were not
amenable to adjudication, and multicentered litigation, which involves
overlapping institutions.'6 This jurisdictional argument does not
require a conclusion regarding the viability of the category of
polycentric disputes or a position on Fuller's rejection of the possibility
of adjudicating them. Many of the cases that courts and commentators
seek to centralize, such as tort cases, fall squarely within the category
13. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (referring to "our deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Robert G.
Bone, Rethinking the 'Day in Court Ideal" and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.YU. L. REv. 193,
203-12 (1992) (providing a historical account of the "Day in Court" ideal).
14. Of course, centralization through mechanisms such as the MDL can create a
momentum towards group treatment of similar suits.
15. This is analogous to the distinction between personal jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction relates only to the court's power over the individual.
Like subject matter jurisdiction, the issue addressed here concerns the power of the courts in
relation to one another.
16. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjuication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,
394-96 (1978). Fuller described a polycentric dispute as one in which each solution will have
"a different set of repercussions and might require in each instance a redefinition of the
'parties affected.'" Id. at 395. He argued that adjudication was ill-suited to resolving
disputes where polycentric elements predominated and that these disputes should be resolved
by managerial direction or contract. Id. at 398.
[Vol. 82:23692372
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of cases that Fuller would have considered appropriate for
adjudication. The size and scope of the litigation, however, is so large
that it presents institutional problems. The most popular solution to
these problems is centralization.
This Article begins by showing that jurisdictional redundancy is a
function of two fundamental features of our legal system: federalism
and adversarial adjudication. To understand how these key features of
our system work, the second Part introduces three important concepts:
strategic choice, horizontal redundancy, and vertical redundancy.'7
This definitional section establishes two central points. First,
jurisdictional redundancy enables pluralism by operating both
horizontally (across court systems) and vertically (within court
systems over time). Second, the strategic manipulation of procedural
rules is an inherent and permanent feature of our system. The mere
use of stratagems in and of itself should not be considered an evil,
although it may be frustrating at times. Instead, rule makers are (and
ought to be) strategists who try to predict and direct litigant behavior.
The third Part of this Article describes recent developments and
proposals for centralizing reforms. It presents the arguments in favor
of centralization and then focuses on recent proposals to further
centralize litigation and to coordinate redundancies between court
systems. This Part shows that the mantra of reformers over the last
forty years has been centralize, centralize, centralize. This consistent
theme has given short shrift to the pluralist values embedded in our
federalist system.
The fourth Part of this Article presents the benefits of multi-
centered litigation. Multicentered litigation has a role in avoiding
error, limiting the deleterious effects of private interest on the system,
permitting innovation, and addressing the effects of decision-maker
ideology. Repetition of litigation, inevitable under a redundant system,
will not prevent errors. But jurisdictional redundancy will decrease the
effects of errors made by any particular court. Moreover, redundancy
permits a more accurate reflection of fundamental disagreements in
political and social life, something that the concept of "error"
(implying the existence of a correct outcome) cannot quite capture.
This insight reminds us that the courts are a political branch. The
same issues that arise in any political system are present there, too. For
this reason, it is important to consider the role of private interests in
17. Cover called horizontal redundancy "synchronic" and vertical redundancy
"sequential." See Cover, supra note 12, at 646. These terms are explained in greater detail
infra Part II.B-C.
2008] 2373
TULANE LA W REVIEW
litigation, the effect of innovation in different courts on the overall
litigation and social landscape, and the role of ideology in legal
decision making. Interest, innovation, and ideology are sources of
what might be described as error, but they are also necessary and
useful characteristics of a liberal pluralist society such as ours.
Given that deep social disagreements persist, the fifth Part of the
Article asks how much pluralism our system can tolerate and then
turns the question around, considering how much uniformity we
should expect in a pluralist society. These are fundamental questions
of political philosophy and social life. As John Rawls posed the
question: "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?"18 Political philosophers continue to search for an answer to
this question.
This Article offers a defense of pluralist values in adjudication
and reminds the reader what is lost in centralizing reforms. In
furtherance of this goal, I propose three factors that judges and policy
makers consider in determining the level of centralization appropriate
in a given case: (1) the extent and nature of underlying substantive
disagreement, (2) the costs of inconsistency, and (3) the role of
political power in the litigation. The fifth Part illustrates how pluralist
values can be taken into account in jurisdictional decisions by applying
these factors to two case studies: a hypothetical pharmaceutical
litigation and In re Naional Securty Agency Telecommunicatons
Records Liigaion.'9 These examples demonstrate the costs and
benefits of both the multicentered and centralizing approaches and
show how important it is for courts to take social context into account
in evaluating what solution is best for a particular litigation.
II. WHAT IS MULTICENTERED LITIGATION?
The concept of multicentered litigation has its roots in legal
pluralism. Legal pluralism is "a situation in which two or more legal
systems coexist in the same social field."'2 This concept can include
18. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xviii (1993).
19. 444 E Supp. 2d 1332 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
20. Sally Engle Merry, LegalPluralism, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 869, 870 (1988). For
thoughtful discussions of pluralism, see DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE:
FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007); CAROL
WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); Paul
Schiff Berman, GlobalLegal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv 1155, 1179-96 (2007); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV.
2374 [Vol. 82:2369
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both formal and informal legal systems, but the focus here is on one
form of juristic legal pluralism as it appears in official, state-
sanctioned forums. Multicentered litigation describes overlapping
legal institutions consisting of multiple state and federal aggregated
and consolidated cases, functioning in tandem with legislative
institutions on the state and federal level.
In the scholarly literature on civil procedure, the idea of legal
pluralism first gained traction in an influential article by Robert Cover
entitled The Uses ofluisdictionalRedundancy. Cover used the term
complex concurrency to refer to our system of courts with overlapping
jurisdiction.22 The existence of overlapping jurisdiction allows for the
creation of multiple, overlapping centers of legal decision making.
Cover suggested three characteristics of a system of complex
concurrency: strategic choice, horizontal (or synchronic) redundancy,
and vertical (or sequential) redundancy.23
Strategic choice and jurisdictional redundancy are features of our
system that have come under attack by centralizing reformers. This is
in part because they often result in frustration to litigants and judges.
That perception ought to be reframed in light of the fact that these
characteristics are the unavoidable result of the twin features of our
legal system: federalism and adversarial adjudication. Later, we shall
see that there is some good to be found in the structure of our legal
system, despite the fact that it gives rise to these complaints. This Part
begins the reframing process by defining the terms for discussion.
4, 11-13 (1983) (detailing Cover's concept of a normative universe); Martha Minow, Keynote,
Before and After Pierce: A Colloquium on Parents, Children, Religion and Schools, 78 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 407, 409-11 (2001) (describing pluralism as the basis for analyzing
Pierce v Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); Brian
Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & Soc'Y 296, 296-300
(2000) (providing a broad overview of legal pluralism). This is by no means an exhaustive
list of the influential work in this field. Inquiries into the benefits of dual systems along
similar lines include Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863 (2006),
and Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Fedemalism, 91 IowA L. REv. 243
(2005).
21. Cover, supra note 12. Many of these ideas have been further developed by Judith
Resnik. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Normative Lessons on American Federalism from the Class
Action Rule of 1966 to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Political Safeguards of
Translocalism and Transnationalism, 156 PENN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (describing and
critiquing the centralization ofjurisdiction in the federal courts).
22. Cover, supra note 12, at 642.
23. Id at 646.
237520081
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A. Strategic Choice
Strategic choice is the tactical deployment of procedure to
manipulate the substantive outcome of a given action. Although it is
ordinarily characterized as abusive, the tactical deployment of
procedure is better understood as inherent in any procedural regime
seeking to regulate adversarial litigation. It represents the expression
of litigant autonomy, something that is usually considered a social
good rather than a social ill.2 The job of the rule drafters and enforcers
is to consider the possibilities for manipulating procedures in rule
structure and enforcement to avoid injustice. In a sense, rule makers
and judges are, or at least ought to be, game theorists. Rather than
jumping to a value judgment of any particular strategic manipulation
of procedure, we need to unpack the meaning of that strategy for the
goals of the system and the larger cultural and ideological context.
The problem is that the goals of the system are many. Therefore,
anyone's judgment about a particular strategic manipulation will be
based on an underlying set of assumptions about the purpose of the
judicial system.
Litigant use of procedure to obtain perceived tactical advantage is
most familiar in the much-maligned practice of "forum shopping."
Strategic choice of forum is utilized both by plaintiffs and defendants.25
Plaintiffs choose to file their complaint in the forum they think will be
most hospitable. Defendants may remove to federal court, a power
greatly expanded by CAFA, which grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over damages class actions valued at over $5 million.26
Either party may move to transfer multiple cases filed all over the
country to a single court. Defendants may wish to centralize cases in
order to drive these lawsuits to global settlement or to save the cost of
defending cases in multiple forums. Depending on the circumstances,
defendants may instead fight that consolidation because they are
concerned that the fact of consolidation itself will increase the number
of suits filed against them. Both sides may try to refile a settlement-
24. Thanks to Martha Minow for this insight.
25. Manipulation by plaintiffs, particularly plaintiffs' attempts to choose certain
friendly courts, has garnered much of the focus of those concerned about forum shopping. It
played a significant role in spurring the passage of CAFA, one of the most significant
expansions of federal jurisdiction since the passage of the Multidistrict Litigation Act. SeeS.
RE. No. 109-14, at 4 ("To make matters worse, current law enables lawyers to 'game' the
procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts whose judges
have reputations for readily certifying classes and approving settlements without regard to
class member interests.").
26. See28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
2376 [Vol. 82:2369
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only class action that had previously been rejected in a new court that
they hope will approve that settlement, or seek an antisuit injunction
barring such refiling.f
Strategic deployment of procedure is not limited to litigants.
Judges can tactically manipulate the timing of decisions or provide
"hints" to the litigants of how they plan to decide a motion in order to
spur settlement. For example, in the Agent Orange litigation, Judge
Weinstein issued a provisional ruling on choice of law that would have
had substantial effects on the outcome of the litigation. The fact that
the ruling was provisional momentarily insulated his ruling from
appellate review while the parties considered the consequences.28
One benefit of strategic choice is that it can result in innovations
that harness repetition. The recent decision by the Honorable Judge
Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York, to hold informal bellwether trials is an example
of such innovation. All litigation arising out of the tragedy of
September I Ith, 2001 was consolidated before Judge Hellerstein 9
Six years after filing suit, the plaintiffs were frustrated at the pace of
the litigation. The judge believed that many of the cases would settle if
the parties could agree on a mutually acceptable value." He ordered
that prior to determining liability, the court would hold damages trials
of selected plaintiffs who would volunteer to participate. The results of
these trials were to be available to other litigants in order to assist them
in valuing cases for settlement.' A little over two months after Judge
27. The court may have the power to issue such an injunction under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
28. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
CouRTs 128-31 (1986); see also Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack
Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010, 2031
(1997) (discussing the problems of unreviewable discretion created by provisional rulings and
the tension between the desirability of judicial innovation and the need for "fresh eyes" to
review decisions).
29. See In re September 11 th Litig., 494 E Supp. 2d 232, 236 (S.D.N.Y 2007). For
an analysis of this phenomenon, see Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective
Coordination: Lessons from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (2008).
30. In re September 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y July 5, 2007)
(opinion supporting order to sever issues of damages and liability in selected cases at 3). But
see Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse. Experiences
with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fung 42 LAW & Soc. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (finding
in a qualitative study that for many 9/11 victims litigation represents important nonmonetary
civic values).
31. In re September 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (opinion supporting order to
sever issues of damages and liability in selected cases at 3).
23772008]
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Hellerstein ordered the damages trials, fourteen of the cases settled.32
It seems likely that in the absence of the bellwether procedure these
cases would not have settled so quickly. One reason for the speedy
settlements may have been the judge's decision in one of the bellwether
cases to grant the defendant's motion in limine and bar certain
evidence of the plaintiff's earning potential and various other aspects
of the events that occurred on September 1 Ith, including events that
occurred on the flight that the plaintiff was traveling on, from being
introduced at trial.3
The decision to push certain cases to trial for the purpose of
settling others in a mass tort case is a strategic deployment of
procedure, but the fact that we call it strategic does not necessarily
violate the principle of reaching a just, speedy, and efficient resolution
of every action.' Instead, strategic choice raises fundamental
questions about what strategies advance the social values the
procedural system seeks to maximize. The problem is that our
procedural system seeks to maximize multiple and not entirely
compatible social values, among them rectitude, norm articulation,
information forcing, accountability, and dispute resolution." We lack a
good theory of procedural justice to sort through these values. For
instance, if the social value that the system seeks to maximize is
rectitude-the correct application of law to the facts-one might
prefer the deployment of procedure to determine liability before
damages. Similarly, if the social value is norm articulation, Judge
Hellerstein's approach of encouraging settlement may be criticized for
failing to provide a trial on liability issues." If the social value that the
32. See In re September II Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2007)
(order closing fourteen cases due to settlement).
33. See In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y Oct. 16, 2007)
(order regarding defendant's motion in limine). I do not evaluate the merits of this decision. I
only intend to point out that the judge created the moment for that decision through
bellwether trials and reverse bifurcation. This then spurred settlement that might have
otherwise been long-delayed.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (commanding that the rules "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
35. See Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silby, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining
the Concept ofDispute, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 151, 153-54 (1984) (commenting that decisions about
litigation are driven by norms of citizenship and community).
36. For the argument that settlement erodes the norm articulation function of the
courts, see Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAltemate Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1987) (questioning "whether the rush to compromise, a characteristic of
numerous ADR methods, will advance the important policies underlying substantive law");
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement is
not preferable to judgment and moreover settlement should not be institutionalized); David
Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2648 (1995)
2378 [Vol. 82:2369
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system seeks to maximize is efficient closure of open cases (what
might be called "pure dispute resolution"), then Judge Hellerstein's
approach was exactly right.
B. Synchronic Redundancy
Synchronic redundancy is the horizontal overlap of multiple
forums deciding the same questions at or around the same time.
Synchronic redundancy occurs when individual cases presenting
similar factual and legal questions are filed in multiple federal district
and state courts. Coordination rules can be employed to limit
synchronic redundancy. The MDL Act was codified in an attempt to
limit synchronic redundancy in federal courts with respect to discovery
and other pretrial proceedings by transferring cases presenting
common questions to one court." The antisuit injunction, another
coordination rule, has recently engaged scholars in the context of class
actions." Settling parties can seek an antisuit injunction preventing
class members from bringing suits in any other forum.9 Or they may
seek a determination that a rival action is barred in the forum where a
competing suit was filed."
Yet coordination rules cannot eradicate synchronic redundancy.
Despite the courts' ability to transfer cases sharing common issues of
fact or law to a single forum, synchronic redundancy persists. Federal
and state courts maintain concurrent jurisdiction over many types of
cases. The Vioxx litigation is illustrative. Vioxx was a prescription
pain relief drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration in May
1999. In September 2004, the drug's manufacturer, Merck, voluntarily
removed it from the market when a study indicated that the use of the
drug increased the risk of some types of heart attacks and strokes.1
(stating that "[t]he opacity of settlements is particularly troubling"); Judith Resnik, Tn'al as
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury. Transforming the Meaning Of Article III, 113 HARV L. REv.
924, 1000-02 (2000) (discussing a normative theorist's concerns about privatization of
judging).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
38. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148, 1148-50 (1998) (arguing in favor of
an expansive ability for unnamed plaintiffs to challenge class actions in other forums); Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class
Action, 156 PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (arguing in favor of a limited reading of the
Anti-Injunction Act based on the passage of CAFA).
39. See Monaghan, supra note 38, at 1150, 1151-52 n.13 (discussing Baker v
General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1998), which distinguished between enforce-
ment and preclusive effects of antisuit injunctions).
40. See Syngenta Crop Prot. Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002).
41. In reVioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 ER.D. 450, 452 (E.D. La. 2006).
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Thousands of cases were filed against Merck and, as in many mass tort
cases, they were consolidated in various forums. Over 7000 cases
were removed to or filed in federal court and aggregated in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) 2 Large numbers of
cases were also filed in New Jersey, California, and Texas.43 The
number of cases filed in New Jersey and consolidated there was
recently approximated at 15,000 suits." Mass torts are ordinarily
characterized by this type of procedural history: thousands of lawsuits
filed in state courts, some removed to federal court and transferred to a
single court under the MDL statute, then consolidated before a single
judge, while other cases remain in state courts and are consolidated
and centralized there.
C Sequential Redundancy
Sequential or diachronic redundancy is the vertical overlap of
decision making or the ability of courts to revisit the decisions of
previous courts. We see sequential redundancy in appeals, the writ of
habeas corpus, and collateral attacks on judgments.45 Sequential
redundancy surfaces in multidistrict litigation, such as when a case is
returned for trial to the transferor court." It appears in the right to
interlocutory appeals in class action certification decisions,3 and in
collateral attacks on class action settlements. Collateral attacks have
surfaced as the most significant and controversial form of sequential
42. See ini re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (J.PM.L.
2005).
43. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., No. 2005-59499 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 20, 2007)
(order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and granting expedited
appeal) (granting partial summary judgment for defendant on grounds that plaintiffs' fraud on
the FDA claims are preempted by federal law).
44. See In reVioxx Litig., 928 A.2d 935, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); N.J.
Judiciary, New Jersey Supreme Court Order (May 20, 2003), available at http://www.
judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/n03061 la.htm (designating all pending and future litigation
statewide involving the drug Vioxx as a mass tort and transferring the management of all
such cases to Atlantic County to be handled on a coordinated basis).
45. For an insightful comparison of habeas and collateral attacks in the class action
context, see William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from
Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 790, 850-54 (2007).
46. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 41-43
(1998).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under
this rule if application is made to it within 10 days after entry of the order. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so
orders.").
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redundancy with respect to class actions. The right to collaterally
attack a class action settlement on the basis of inadequate representa-
tion is uncontested in principle, but there is no agreement on its
parameters." Some scholars argue that the right to collateral attack
ought to be limited and others have argued for its expansion."
Several doctrines prevent courts from revisiting previous
decisions of the same facts or law. First, a decision by the JPML to
transfer cases for pretrial litigation cannot be appealed except by
extraordinary writ."0  The reexamination clause in the Seventh
Amendment limits reexamination of an issue of fact determined by a
jury." The doctrine of res judicata limits litigants' ability to relitigate a
claim that was or could have been raised in a prior action." The
doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of the same issue
and can be used offensively by a party that did not litigate the issue in
the first action. 3 Preclusion is a particularly powerful tool in the class
action context, where settlement of a class action in one forum will
extinguish all claims, even those that could not have been brought in
the settling forum.'
48. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam). An
evenly divided court affirmed the judgment below on the question of whether collateral
attack was permitted by claimant who discovered injury after close of settlement. Id.
49. For arguments in favor of limiting the right to collateral attack, see Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard Nagareda, Class Action Settlements UnderAttack, 156 PENN L. REv.
(forthcoming 2008); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for
'4dequacy"in Class Actions.- A Critique ofEpstein v. M.C.A., Inc., 73 N.YU. L. REv. 765,
782 (1998) (arguing against a broad right to collaterally attack class action settlements on the
basis of inadequate representation and proposing a narrower basis for collateral attack). For
an argument favoring an expansive right to collateral attack, see Monaghan, supra note 38, at
1152-53 (arguing in favor of a broad right for absent class members to challenge preclusive
class judgments in their chosen forum).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2000) (limiting review of orders).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. CompareInreRhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 E3d 1293,
1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the reexamination clause limits a court's ability to bifurcate
cases in mass torts), with Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment
Reexamination Clause, 83 IowA L. Rv. 499, 501-02 (1998) (reaching the opposite
conclusion).
52. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 474 (1998); 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDwARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4406, at 138-44 (2d ed. 2002).
53. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supm note 52, § 4416, at 386-412.
54. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (holding
that the Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to state
judgments even when the state court judgment at issue incorporates a class action settlement
releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of federal courts, as long as they comply with
due process). Subsequently, on remand the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's
decision determined that the state court judgment comported with due process. See Epstein
v. MCA, Inc., 179 E3d 641,649-50 (9th Cir. 1999); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
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III. CENTRALIZATION IN CONTEXT
Complex concurrency is a source of frustration for judges,
legislators, and civil procedure scholars because it creates
inefficiencies, is difficult to coordinate, and makes global settlement of
mass cases challenging. The widespread reaction to complex
concurrency since the late 1950s has been centralization. The factors
driving centralization are familiar. Repetitive litigation of the same
questions is costly and courts have scarce resources. It is efficient to
centralize cases in order to gain economies of scale in decision
making, avoid costly repetition of discovery, and perhaps spur private
settlement to resolve cases without further expenditure of court
resources. This Part presents the arguments in favor of centralization,
describes the historical developments that led to what Richard Marcus
calls a "maximalist" use of centralizing procedures," and presents
some recent proposals to centralize litigation even further.
A. Why Cenftalize?
There are four reasons why scholars and policy makers favor
centralization in litigation: it reduces transaction costs, produces
uniformity, avoids inconsistent judgments, and reduces litigant abuse.
First, centralization saves transaction costs. Many cases, such as those
transferred and consolidated to a single court under the auspices of the
JPML, involve similar factual and legal issues. Having multiple
judges in different districts or court systems manage overlapping
discovery, for example, can result in multiple depositions of key
witnesses and repetitive pretrial motions. Although duplicative
discovery is less of an issue with the advent of electronic record
keeping, multiple depositions and redundant motions impose
significant costs on the court system, litigants, and witnesses.
Second, a centralized system produces uniform results, reducing
the costs of coordination. By contrast, competing systems generate
confusion about what the law is and uncertainty about outcomes of
Sales Practice Litig., 261 E3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001) ("It is now settled that a judgment
pursuant to a class settlement can bar later claims based on the allegations underlying the
claims in the settled class action. This is true even though the precluded claim was not
presented, and could not have been presented, in the class action itself."). Some state courts
have been very receptive to collateral attacks for citizens of their states in nationwide class
actions. See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 2003 VT 17, 68, 175 Vt. 239, 268, 826 A.2d
997, 1020 (2003).
55. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Em of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistnct Litigation Panel!s Transfer Power, 82 TutL. L. R v. 2245,
2258 (2008).
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particular cases. Coordination and uniformity will not necessarily lead
to predictability in a legal system. Nevertheless, uniformity can
combat the threat posed by multiple legal decision makers (courts and
legislatures on the state and federal level) making decisions affecting
the national economy."
Third, centralization avoids the risk of inconsistent judgments. If
multiple forums are hearing the same type of case, then some cases
may come out differently. This heterogeneity may be unacceptable
with respect to some questions, such as privileges, where inconsistency
can result in directly contradictory court orders with respect to
identical subject matter." This problem is more severe where there is a
single court that is an outlier with respect to an issue on which all other
courts agree. This phenomenon can in turn encourage forum shopping
and other strategic manipulations of the system to move cases to the
outlier court, perhaps giving it more power than it deserves.
Centralization and coordination solve this problem by eliminating or
controlling the outlier (unless, of course, the litigation is concentrated
in the outlier court).
Fourth, centralization alleviates concerns about litigants abusing
the system through strategic choices. Many have noted the potential
for abuse of synchronic redundancies. For example, in the class action
context, sometimes plaintiffs' class counsel have been accused of
employing a "reverse auction."58 These lawyers may take advantage of
absent class members by seeking certification of a settlement that was
disapproved of by a federal court in a more friendly state court. The
concern is that class counsel will agree to suboptimal global
settlements because they are risk averse. 9 Defendants have an interest
in buying off the class counsel with the promise of guaranteed
payment in order to reduce their overall exposure and obtain global
peace. Synchronic redundancy allows risk averse litigants to seek out
the forum that will accept such settlements. There are some
56. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLAL. REV. 1353, 1356 (2006).
57. I discuss this issue infra Part V.B.
58. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1370 (1995) (describing the reverse auction phenomenon as "a
jurisdictional competition among different teams of plaintiffs' attorneys in different actions
that involve the same underlying allegations").
59. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability Reconciling Exit, Voice,
andLoyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 390-93 (2000) (discussing
risk aversion of class counsel).
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documented examples of this happening. ° It is notable that this
criticism is never levied at federal courts certifying class actions.
A related concern is the filing of class action lawsuits, for
settlement or litigation, in jurisdictions that will rubber stamp class
certification.6' Some fear that by obtaining certification in a forum
hospitable to class actions, plaintiffs can exercise inordinate power
over defendants to settle regardless of the merits of the underlying
claim.62 On examination, both of these problems appear to be
exaggerated.63 Perhaps in response to these concerns, CAFA provides
that class actions removed to federal court may be subsequently
transferred to another district permitting defendants substantial leeway
to manipulate forum selection.'
Fears of abuse through strategic manipulation of multiple forums
are animated by several principles. Those concerned about individual
due process and process-based participation rights worry that
individual class members are not getting their due. Others, concerned
with the ability of the judiciary to adequately enforce legal standards
and monitor lawyers in the aggregation context, express anxiety that
plaintiffs' lawyers will enrich themselves at the expense of the class or
innocent defendants. Still others are concerned that the judicial system
is not institutionally competent to enforce laws governing conduct that
causes mass harms. They believe this is a type of ex post liability that
60. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned
a notorious settlement in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products
Liability Litigation, 55 E3d 768, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1995). Undeterred, the parties refiled the
settlement in Louisiana state court, where essentially the same settlement was approved. See
White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97-1028, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98); 718 So. 2d 480, 481.
61. These are sometimes referred to as "judicial hell holes." Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates, and Bad Social Science. Lessons from West Virginia,
110 W VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
62. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 E3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995);
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
63. See Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death" Class Certification and Blackmail,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429-30 (2003) (refuting "blackmail" thesis). Thomburg, supra note
61 (demonstrating that the American Tort Reform Association study misuses statistics and is
misleading in other respects); Adam Liptak, The Worst Courts for Businesses? It a Matter of
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at AI0 (describing and critiquing an American Tort
Reform Association publication purporting to rank these courts); see also PUB. CITIZEN,
CLASS ACTION "JUDICIAL HELLHOLES": EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE Is LACKING 3 (2005), http://
www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf (critiquing claims of the existence of districts
particularly unfriendly to defendants or corporations, and finding that even the jurisdiction
that showed evidence of unsubstantiated class certification had reduced its certification rate
by 30% between 2003 and 2004).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(C)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
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would be more optimally administered through ex ante regulation. 5
These worries are sometimes expressed in lamentations about the
deleterious effects of suits on the ability of businesses to thrive.
B. Histoncal Trends
As Richard Marcus and Judith Resnik have ably demonstrated,
the minimalist policy in favor of using tools such as MDL transfer for
coordination and consolidation of limited types of cases for limited
purposes has been transformed into a maximalist regime of
centralization.66 Over time, concern seems to have shifted to solving
the problems posed by complex concurrency through global peace.
The animating assumption of scholars, policy makers, and jurists has
been towards aggregation, not the individual's day in court. This shift
occurred for a variety of reasons. Like any large-scale historical
development, it is impossible to point to a single cause. Some leading
candidates include: the perception of an increase in lawsuits, a
growing population, increasing economic activity, the passage of
significant civil rights legislation, and the resulting sense that there was
a burden on the administration of the courts that must somehow be
addressed.
The growth of economic activity of national scope created what
historian Lizabeth Cohen has called the "Consumers' Republic." 9
Advocates for consumer rights pushed for national legislation
governing standards for everything from car safety to mortgages, and
in the process created individual rights so that some of those standards
65. The American system that largely eschews ex ante regulatory regimes for ex post
liability as a means for deterrence has been the subject of significant scholarly literature in
political science and economics. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 4 (2001) (contrasting the American preference for litigated rather
than legislated alternatives with the European model of greater ex ante regulation); Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 359-63
(1984) (presenting an economic analysis of ex post liability regimes); see also Samuel
Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 375, 378 (2007) (expressing
"concern about the general tenor of tort reform and other initiatives whose effect, when
examined en masse, is to circumscribe the availability of ex post accountability as a necessary
complement to the liberalized ex ante economic environment in the United States").
66. SeeMarcus, supra note 55, at 2258-74; Resnik, supranote 1, at 42-43.
67. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 42-43.
68. But see Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law. The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REv. 285, 304 n. 104 (2002) (describing and debunking the critique
that litigation in America has increased substantially). Galanter points out that lawsuit filings
declined from 1990 to 2001. Id.
69. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003).
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could be vindicated through lawsuits rather than solely through
regulatory enforcement."° Consumer suits were the basis for the
adoption of the controversial damages class action codified in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). As Justice Douglas explained in
1974, at what was arguably the high tide of the consumer movement:
I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to
be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures
who would go begging for justice without the class action but who
could with all regard to due process be protected by it. Some of these
are consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have
no practical recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief. Some
may be environmentalists who have no photographic development plant
about to be ruined because of air pollution by radiation but who suffer
perceptibly by smoke, noxious gases, or radiation. Or the unnamed
individual may be only a ratepayer being excessively charged by a
utility, or a homeowner whose assessment is slowly rising beyond his
ability to pay.
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant
has against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his
hand with the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to
the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.71
Justice Douglas's perception illustrates a theme discussed in the fourth
Part of this Article: the role of interest and ideology in arguments
about multicentered versus centralized litigation.
A few recent jurisdictional developments have further spurred the
trend toward centralization. The biggest formal change has been the
passage of CAFA, which expanded federal court jurisdiction to
encompass essentially any class action. 2 Additionally, judges have
deployed preclusion doctrine and antisuit injunctions to prevent
litigation in competing forums.73
Informal developments have also spurred centralization. For
instance, in cases that have been transferred under the MDL statute,
transferee judges can arrange to sit by designation to try cases that
have been transferred back to their home courts. Moreover, because
both state and federal courts consolidate similar cases through
70. See id. at 345-87 (describing the rise of the consumers' movement and political
responses).
71. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
73. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone!
Firestone ) , 333 F3d 763, 765-68 (7th Cir. 2003).
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mechanisms like the federal MvIDL Act, judges can informally
coordinate different aspects of these cases, including dispositive
motions, discovery decisions, summary judgment, and other pretrial
procedures with their counterparts in other courts. Such coordination
can alter the course of the litigation and is one expression of the
strategic deployment of procedure. For example, several judges
overseeing aggregated cases concerning a particular type of product
might decide between them to hold off on deciding summary
judgment motions until the most opportune time to push the parties
toward settlement. Such under-the-radar practices may raise due
process concerns if litigants are denied the opportunity to present their
case in such discussion between judges. They may also raise concerns
about judicial independence if one judge tries to inappropriately
influence the decisions of another. On the other hand, communication
between judges avoids a gastonette, where each court waits for the
other to decide." Consultation allows judges to learn from one another
and hopefully produce better decisions as a result.
Judges are not the only ones coordinating strategies. Attorneys in
different jurisdictions, within and without the confines of cases
aggregated through MDL or other state procedures, communicate with
one another, sharing information, advice, and coordinating strategy.75
This is not a new development, 6 but the growth of information
technology has made national and international coordination easier.
As a result of informal coordination, aggregate settlements have
continued within and without the class action context. While some
thought that the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v
Windsoif might limit the ability of defendants to obtain global peace,
it appears that aggregation techniques and strategic planning have
made something like global peace possible even in the absence of class
certification.
74. In re McLean Indus., Inc., 857 E2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (dismissing an appeal
without prejudice and permitting a case to go forward in the Singapore court that was already
considering the issues).
75. See generally Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Cnrsis: Mass Tort
Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 863, 896-97 (describing the networks between
plaintiffs' attorneys in mass tort cases as a replacement to the formal centralization of the
class action).
76. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement- An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571, 1624
(2004).
77. 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
78. The latest example is the Vioxx settlement. See Berenson, supra note 3.
2008] 2387
TULANE LA W REVIEW
C Proposals To Increase Centalization
Proposals to further the maximalist approach to multidistrict
litigation and other centralizing procedures continue to proliferate.
Such proposals fall into two categories. One set of proposals attempts
to limit synchronic redundancy. These proposals seek to consolidate in
one forum cases that might otherwise have proceeded simultaneously
in different forums. Antidotes to synchronic redundancy include
revisiting the Kiaxon rule, allowing MDL transferee courts to retain
cases through trial, expanding lawyers' capacity to reach aggregate
settlements, and broadening the availability of antisuit injunctions.
Another category of proposals seeks to limit sequential redundancy,
such as by limiting access to collateral attacks or narrowing the
appellate standard of review.
The existence of multiple legal systems within the United States
is the central cause of synchronic redundancy. Coordination between
these systems is costly and this cost seems more wasteful in cases
alleging harms caused by products sold nationally. Some scholars
have argued that CAFA's expansion of federal court jurisdiction over
nationwide consumer class actions traditionally governed by varied
state laws requires the implementation of a national choice-of-law
regime.79 For example, one scholar has suggested that all "conduct that
arises from mass produced goods entering the stream of commerce
with no preset purchaser or destination should be treated as... goods
in the national market" for choice-of-law purposes and governed by
the law of the home state of the defendant.' Such a rule would limit
synchronic redundancy by preventing multiple legal regimes from
asserting the power to apply their own substantive law in a given case.
Proposals to limit synchronic redundancy have also been
circulating with respect to multidistrict litigation. In Lexecon Inc. v
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, the Supreme Court limited
MDL transferee courts to adjudicating the pretrial phase of cases by
reading § 1407 narrowly.' Congress has considered several bills to
permit transferee courts to retain cases through trial, though none have
passed into law." The passage of such a bill would complete the
79. See Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1869.
80. Id at 1842.
81. 523 U.S. 26,40 (1998).
82. See Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong.
(2005); Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004);
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong.
(2001).
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centralization process begun by the MDL statute. The ALl Project on
Aggregate Litigation has also proposed more formal treatment of
settlement in aggregate litigation, a powerful tool for centrally
resolving large-scale litigation.83 Currently, the relevant ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct, adopted in most jurisdictions, requires
that lawyers representing multiple clients should not participate in
aggregate settlements "unless each client gives informed consent, in a
writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the
existence and nature of all the claims ... involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement."84  The ALI reform
proposal permits lawyers to obtain binding waivers from clients who
agree in advance of negotiation to abide by any settlement approved by
a supermajority of the other plaintiffs. The reforms concomitantly
provide protections similar to those available in class settlements to
aggregate settlements reached under the auspices of an MIDLY The
ALI reform would permit lawyers to curtail the synchronic redundancy
enabled by the rule requiring lawyers to consult clients on an
individual basis when representing "inventory" cases. It would spur
centralization of settlements by making it easier for lawyers to reach an
aggregate agreement.
A final proposal for limiting synchronic redundancy is the
expansion of antisuit injunctions. Courts have upheld the use of
antisuit injunctions under the All Writs Act both where a class has
been certified and where certification was denied.86 For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld an
injunction barring a state court from considering certification of a
class that had been denied certification by the federal courts." This
decision centralized the power to determine whether certification is
appropriate in one court, but it also worked against centralization by
barring class-wide litigation in any court. Not surprisingly, a
83. AM. LAW INST., supra note 4.
84. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2003).
85. AM. LAW INST., supra note 4. The proposal has met with some criticism. See
Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort
Lawsuits, 41 S.TEX. L. REv. 149, 181-82 (1999).
86. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20.32 (2004).
87. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bridgestone/Firestone
I), 333 E3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003). This decision specifically carved out settlement-only
class actions. Id. at 767.
88. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1475, 1520 (2005).
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settlement-only class action was subsequently approved in state court.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld an
injunction barring parallel state proceedings after it had certified a
national class action for settlement." Where a class is denied
certification based on inadequate representation, courts have held that
they lack personal jurisdiction over the absent class members and
therefore there can be no preclusive effect to the judgment.9' To
strengthen centralization, some scholars have argued that antisuit
injunctions ought to be used earlier in the litigation, before a decision
on certification has been rendered, where the federal court is
concerned about negative effects of strategic choice. 2
Attempting to reign in sequential (or vertical) redundancy, some
scholars have advocated limiting the ability of litigants to bring
collateral attacks on settlements in the class action context. The
general principle is that class action settlements meeting due process
requirements are binding on all absent class members regardless of the
court in which the settlement was certified and approved. Absent
class members may collaterally attack a settlement on the basis of
adequacy of representation. But the circuits are split as to what this
means. Some courts think that a finding of adequacy in the first forum
can be relitigated and reevaluated by a second forum.9" Others have
interpreted the due process requirement to be limited to an evaluation
by the reviewing court of whether the procedures were in place in the
first proceeding to ensure adequacy, without reevaluating the
89. See Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Cause No. B-170,462, 2004 WL
546883, at *1 (Tex. Dist. Mar. 12, 2004); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Judge Approves $149
Million Firestone Tire Settlement, But Not All Class Members Think It a Good Deal,
LAW.COM, Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1079640446435.
90. In re Diet Drugs, 282 E3d 220, 232 (3d Cir. 2002).
91. In reFord Motor Co., 471 E3d 1233, 1243 (11 th Cir. 2006).
92. See Wolff, supia note 38.
93. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (holding
that a federal court must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment settling federal
claims under the Full Faith and Credit Act).
94. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 E3d 249, 257-61 (2d Cir. 2001)
(permitting a plaintiff whose injuries manifested themselves after the expiration of a class-
wide settlement to collaterally attack the settlement on grounds of adequacy of
representation), afft in part, vacated in part Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111
(2003); see also State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 2003 VT 17, 23-59, 175 Vt. 239, 251-65,
826 A.2d 997, 1007-18 (2003) (permitting Vermont residents to bring suit because of
inadequate representation in initial action, despite an Alabama judgment purporting to
resolve all claims nationwide).
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substantive finding.95 This split has basically tracked the treatment in
legal scholarship, with some added nuances not central to the
discussion here.96 The debate centers on the following question: How
many opportunities should litigants have to revisit the same issues in a
system with scarce resources?
The obvious benefits of centralization underlying these proposals
are efficiency, certainty, and, in some cases, the prevention of abuse.
Horizontal and vertical redundancies are often depicted as offering
numerous opportunities for strategic manipulation. Rarely recognized,
however, is the fact that every aspect of the procedural system, from
filing through discovery, dispositive motions, and finally trial, is the
subject of such stratagems whether cases are centralized or not.
Moreover, centralization and the coordination it requires in a
multilayered federalist system such as ours carries with it substantial
difficulties and costs.
A closer look at any such strategic choice reveals the complexity
of the system and the difficulty of curing perceived abuses through
centralizing reforms. For example, forum shopping is often discussed
as a reason for various centralizing reforms.97 The whole picture is
more complex and therefore not amenable to a simple coordinating
solution. One example of this complexity is the phenomenon of
95. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 E3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that collateral
attack is never available provided that procedures were in place to ensure the adequacy of
representation in initial proceeding).
96. Scholars who would limit the right to collateral attack include Issacharoff &
Nagareda, supra note 49 (arguing in favor of a process-based approach to collateral attack),
and Kahan & Silberman, supra note 49, at 774 (arguing for limitations on collateral attack
based on adequacy of representation in light of right to opt out). Scholars favoring more
expansive rights to litigate the adequacy of representation in a collateral proceeding include
David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral
Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 282-85 (2006)
(arguing in favor of broad review of settlement outcomes in collateral proceedings based on
fairness criteria); Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight ofAbsent Class Members
Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787, 1862 (2004) (arguing in
favor of de novo review of adequacy by reviewing court); Monaghan, supra note 38, at 1162-
78 (arguing in favor of right to litigate questions of adequacy in collateral forum); Patrick
Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits,
79 TEx. L. REv. 383, 389-97 (2000) (same). Still others have adopted a middle ground. See
Rubenstein, supra note 45 (presenting a multifactored test); Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 804 (2005) (arguing that the
court reviewing the initial judgment should "constrain the judgment's effect upon the claims
not litigated in that action to the extent necessary to cure the prejudice that the absentees
would otherwise suffer from the inadequate representation of their interests").
97. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333, 384-91 (2006)
(describing and critiquing representations of forum shopping as a form of "cheating" instead
of a legitimate strategy).
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"settlement shopping." When one court rejects a settlement as
fundamentally unfair to absent class members, the parties may obtain
class certification of the same settlement in a second court.90
Settlement shopping is made possible by centralization and is also the
subject of centralizing reforms.
The power of preclusion, combined with the availability of
parallel forums, creates the possibility of global peace regardless of the
previous court's assessment of the desirability of the particular
arrangement at issue. In the Bridgestone-Firestone Ligation, the
Seventh Circuit denied certification of a nationwide class and barred
any other court from reconsidering class certification." A rival class
action was certified in state court as a settlement class action.' Even
if certification was truly barred, the resulting nonclass individual cases
may nevertheless be resolved as an aggregate settlement. Or, if the
amount at stake is sufficiently small and certification is impossible, the
plaintiffs may need to withdraw their individual suits. In sum, litigant
ingenuity will almost always outpace the development of tools for
controlling the strategic deployment of procedure.
IV THE BENEFITS OF MULTICENTERED LITIGATION
The benefits of pluralism are rarely discussed in modem
scholarly literature on complex litigation.'"' Some scholars have
argued that centralization serves as an unwarranted limitation on
states' rights, especially if some kind of national law were used rather
than paying attention to each state's legal regime.' 2 Others have
expressed concerns about the consequences of aggregation and class
treatment for individuals, particularly in light of the possibilities for
plaintiffs' lawyers to trade off the interests of one group in favor of
98. See Koniak, supra note 96, at 1780 (discussing the possibility of abuse through
settlement shopping); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 134 E3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing how after the Third Circuit rejected a
settlement, "the parties to the settlement repaired to the 18th Judicial District for the Parish of
Iberville, Louisiana, where a similar suit had been pending, restructured their deal, and
submitted it to the Louisiana court, which ultimately approved it").
99. 333 E3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003); Jeffreys, supra note 89.
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. Judith Resnik's work is an exception to this assertion. See, e.g., Judith Resnik,
Lawk Migmtion: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism k Multiule
Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1647-51 (2006) (approving of multiple avenues for the
adoption of foreign law into the U.S. legal system, including federal, state, and local legal
systems).
102. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 5, at 654.
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another.'°3 But beyond these specific concerns, there is seldom
discussion of the social value of the institutional conflict produced by
complex concurrency. A multifaceted consideration of the values
advanced by multicentered litigation is therefore in order.
This discussion of the benefits of multiplicity is largely based on
the idea that institutional conflict serves some social values. Mass tort
cases present one area for institutional conflict. Consider harms
suffered by patients who took certain pharmaceutical drugs. The
conflict concerns four different types of institutions: courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, and corporations, operating at
three levels: state, federal, and international. The product is regulated
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and while some state
legislatures have enacted preemption provisions, other states have
robust failure to warn claims. Lawsuits are brought in both state and
federal courts. What conduct the FDA fails to regulate ex ante, a court
may regulate through the enforcement (and development) of applicable
laws ex post. Conflicts surface when courts and administrative
agencies regulate the same conduct. Some advocate using preemption
doctrine to resolve this institutional conflict by placing power
exclusively in the hands of the federal agency."4 Within the purview of
the courts, state and federal decisions may differ, creating circuit splits
and contradictory rulings. Coordination between courts, consolidation
of cases, and transfer of cases to a single district are all methods of
resolving these conflicts between and within court systems.
Institutional conflict can encourage the development of new
approaches to social problems. It can furthermore correct for systemic
103. Many have written excellent work on this topic. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein,
EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 521-23 (1994).
104. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not resolved this question. SeeWyeth
v. Levine, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (presenting the question of whether the FDA's prescription
drug labeling judgments preempt state law liability claims for failure to warn); Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam) (affirming the ruling of the
Second Circuit, which held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not preempt
product liability claims under Michigan law against drug manufacturers that allegedly
defrauded the FDA); see also Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., No. 2005-59499 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 20,
2007) (order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and granting
expedited appeal) (holding that plaintiff's fraud on the FDA claims are preempted); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Fedemlization of Tort Law,
56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227, 242-58 (2007) (describing the replacement of private enforcement by
public enforcement through preemption and proposing ways to harness this development to
improve transparency in regulation); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System:
Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
Poiy L. & ETHICS 587, 613 (2005) (critiquing arguments in favor of preemption and
proposing a consultative relationship between the FDA and courts in certain products liability
suits).
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errors resulting from two different types of biases: ideological and
interest-based. The remainder of this Part will discuss the ways that
the institutional conflict supported by jurisdictional redundancy can
have positive effects or at least reduce certain types of problems
associated with political authority.
A. Encouraging Multiplicity
Judges have developed some procedures within the confines of a
centralized litigation to encourage multiplicity. The bellwether trial is
one such innovation. We saw earlier how bellwether trials were used to
resolve some cases in the September 11 th litigation.'5 A similar
approach resulted in multiple trials in the Vioxx litigation. Tens of
thousands of Vioxx lawsuits were filed in the United States and
aggregated in one federal court and in several state courts. This
massive litigation was eventually settled on the basis of sixteen
lawsuits that had been tried to verdict. At the time of settlement, six of
these suits had resulted in verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, and one of
these was slated for retrial.'" Juries found for the defendant in ten
lawsuits, with one of these additional cases slated for retrial.' 7
105. See supm notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
106. Humeston v. Merck Co., No. ATL-L 2272-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 12,
2007) (awarding a $47 million verdict in favor of the plaintiff on retrial); Cona v. Merck &
Co., No. ALT-L-3553-05-MT (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 5, 2006) (rendering a verdict for
the plaintiff), affU in part, rev in par4 No. A-0076-07TI0076-07T1, 2008 WL 2199871
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2008); McDarby v. Merck Co., No. ATL-L-1296-050MT
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 5, 2006) (awarding $13.5 million to plaintiff), affU mi part,
revdinpar No. A-0076-07T10076-07T1, 2008 WL 2199871 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May
29, 2008); Ernst v. Merck & Co., No. 19961 BH02 (rendering judgment for the plaintiff in
the amount of $26.1 million) (Tex. Dist. June 23, 2006), revd, No. 14-06-00835-CV, 2008
WL 2201769 (Tex. App. May 29, 2008); Garza v. Merck, No. DC-03-84 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 21,
2006) (reducing on remittitur a $32 million verdict for the plaintiff to $8.7 million), revb No.
04-07-00234-CV, 2008 WL 2037350 (Tex. App. May 14, 2008). A new trial was ordered in
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 448 F Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. La. 2006) (holding
that a $51 million verdict awarded to the plaintiff in Bamett v Merck, No. 06-485 (E.D. La.
Aug. 17, 2006), was excessive).
107. Plunkett v Merck& Co. was slated for retrial after a defense verdict. InreVioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 E Supp. 2d 587, 588 (E.D. La. 2007). In the following cases, the jury
reached defense verdicts: Dedrick v. Merck & Co., No. 05-2524, slip op. at 1 (E.D. La. Dec.
15, 2006); Mason v. Merck & Co., No. 06-8 10, slip op. at I (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2006); Smith
v. Merck & Co., No. 05-4379, slip op. at 1 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2006); Albright v. Merck & Co.,
No. 05-2316 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2006); Grossberg v. Merck 7 Co., No. BC327729 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2006); Kozic v. Merck & Co., No. 03-CA-009248 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8,
2007); Schwaller v. Merck & Co., No. 05-L-687 (I11. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007); Hermans v.
Merck & Co., No. ALT-L-5520-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 3, 2007); Doherty v. Merck
& Co., No. ATL-L-638-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 13, 2006).
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It is not clear what conclusions can be reached based on this
collection of cases because we have little sense of the sampling
method used and the underlying variances in the population of cases
being sampled. We do not know whether the sixteen sample cases
were randomly selected. It is impossible to draw conclusions from a
nonrandom sample because strategic decisions by the parties play a
role in which cases reach trial. Some cases will be removed from the
sample by settlements."°8 Defendants can delay some cases and allow
others to proceed more quickly by manipulating the discovery or
motion process. Similarly, plaintiffs can push some cases forward
through aggressive prosecution because they think they are particularly
likely to win these suits. They may not pursue risky or weak cases as
vigorously.
If decision makers know the types of strategic maneuvering
engaged in by the parties, they might be able to describe the ways in
which the sample is skewed. For example, if defendants were settling
the best cases, then we would expect the sample to be skewed in favor
of defense verdicts. Similarly, if defendants were able to
systematically delay the cases they perceived as posing the greatest
risk of loss to them, the sample would also be skewed towards defense
verdicts. On the other hand, if plaintiffs were successful in pushing
only their best cases forward, we might expect that the sample
misrepresents the potential win rate or award amounts of the larger
population of cases.
Despite these cautionary notes, the use of statistical techniques in
conducting sample trials could lead to settlements or judgments that
reflect what the outcome would be if all the cases were tried to a jury."9
Such a procedure would require the court to randomly select a number
of cases for trial, and then utilize the results of those cases to
108. Merck had asserted that it would not settle any Vioxx cases. SeeAlex Berenson,
Legal Stance May Pay Off for Merck, N.Y TtMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at Cl ("[L]awyers on both
sides agree that Merck's victories, and its stated strategy of trying every case rather than
settling any, are discouraging plaintiffs with weaker claims.").
109. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 576, 634-37
(2008). For other considerations of the topic, see Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication:
Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561,650 (1993)
(concluding that under a rights-based theory, sampling is an acceptable form of resolving
mass tort cases only in instances of extreme process scarcity); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the
Tial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 826-30 (1992) (presenting utilitarian arguments in
favor of using sample cases to resolve mass tort cases); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Damages, 83 IowA L. REv. 545, 546-47 (1998) (presenting efficiency arguments in
favor of statistical adjudication of damages).
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extrapolate outcomes for the larger population. Assuming that the
variance within the population is not too great, a bellwether trial
procedure could produce across a large population results approaching
what a jury would find in an individual case while minimizing
substantial delay costs. On the other hand, if the variance between
outcomes in the population is large, then such a procedure is likely to
yield an unfair distribution. Distributive justice problems are most
serious in extremely heterogeneous groups. This is because people
with divergent characteristics will receive the same awards under a
bellwether trial procedure that uses averaging as the method of
extrapolation. Those with the expectation of the highest value awards
will have those awards systematically redistributed to those with the
lowest value awards in the averaging process. '
A type of bellwether trial procedure was utilized in two cases in
the early 1990s: a human rights class action and a set of consolidated
asbestos cases."' The Ninth Circuit upheld the use of statistical
adjudication in the human rights class action but a similar procedure
was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in the asbestos context."2 Since then,
the procedure has only been used informally, raising concerns about
strategic choice in sample selection."3 Formal use of bellwether trials
creates opportunities for divergent outcomes to surface even within a
centralized litigation. When tried to a jury in the transferor court,
bellwether trials allow multiple decision makers to consider cases and
enable socially valuable redundancy.
B. Error andRepeion
In the sciences and social science disciplines such as statistics,
reproducibility is necessary for results to be considered accurate. For
110. SeeLahav, supm note 109, at 581-89; see alsoBone, supmnote 109, at 599 n.108
("Sampling systematically biases outcomes in high-damage cases, thereby affecting a transfer
from high to low damage plaintiffs.").
111. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(using bellwether trials in asbestos consolidation), affd in part, vacated in par4 151 E3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 E Supp. 1460, 1464-66 (D.
Haw. 1995) (using bellwether trials in human rights class action), affU sub nom., Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
112. See cases cited supm note 111.
113. See, e.g., Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F3d 355, 359-60, 372 (2d Cir.
2003) (affirming use of bellwether trial to assist in the settlement of twenty-two cases
involving Legionnaires' disease on a cruise ship); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 E3d 1190,
1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming use of bellwether trials to resolve a case involving
uranium contamination in a community); In re September 11 th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) (opinion supporting order to sever issues of damages and liability in
selected cases at 5) (ordering sample trials of volunteer cases for damages only).
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example, scientific experiments must be capable of being reproduced
in different laboratories. Econometricians will repeat analysis of data
sets conducted by their peers in order to verify results."' This
scientific concept is not dissimilar from the idea of the maturation of a
mass tort."5 A mature mass tort has been defined as one "where there
are sufficient data points to establish the criteria and values of
legitimate claims and the amount for each category of claim can
readily be established."" '
The repetition of litigation permits observers to make distinctions
between cases based on legal or factual categories, to determine the
potential for legal liability in these categories, and to value various
categories of claims. These categories develop by repeated trials of
different cases in different jurisdictions over a period of many years.
Reproducing the same results in trials in different forums can thus lead
to an emerging consensus on the validity and value of claims. Lawyers
and insurance companies have been engaged in similar analysis since
the Industrial Revolution."7 This is in many ways also the story of the
tobacco and asbestos litigations."8 Over time, the process of mass tort
"maturation" through the trial of individual cases in different
jurisdictions appears to have become increasingly centralized and to
have sped up. The recent Vioxx litigation is an example of this
combination of centralization, repetition, and (relative) speed of
innovation. A new term may be needed to describe its trajectory.
Judge Goodrich of the Third Circuit wrote in 1943: "A law suit is
not a laboratory experiment for the discovery of physical laws of
universal application ... ."' When the results of redundant trials in
parallel forums diverge, as occurred in the Vioxx cases, we learn
something more than the lack of consensus. We are prompted to look
114. For excellent examples of the importance of this work, see Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Shooting Down the 'More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REv.
1193, 1223-30 (2003); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical
Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 796-811 (2005).
115. The concept of a "mature" mass tort was originally proposed by Francis
McGovern. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 659 (1989).
116. Francis E. McGovern, A Proposed Settlement Rule for Mass Torts, 74 UMKC L.
REv. 623, 631-32 (2006).
117. See generally Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 76 (discussing the beginnings of
aggregation in the practice of tort law in response to mass industrial harm).
118. See Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts. Litigation as a Legislative
Strategy-Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPALJL L. Rev. 493,
494, 507-09 (2001) (describing the settlement of the tobacco cases by state governments and
discussing the complex relationship between litigation and social policy).
119. Homstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 133 E2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1943).
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at the potential forum and decision-maker effects that may cause large
variances. That is, we must ask whether different juries reached
different results because of the plaintiff's case or because of who the
decision maker was. Robert Cover explained that "[p]resented with
such verdicts, one cannot easily pass judgment on questions of error
... without first unpacking what might be called forum effects. The
redundant forum causes us to focus on forum variables just as
redundant testimony causes us to focus on testimony variables. '" 2'
Cover argued that jurisdictional redundancy was too blunt a tool to
increase accuracy with respect to specific issues of fact, but instead
corresponds to more general political differences. Divergence or
consensus will often be a reflection of political factors. Depending on
the social and political context of the particular issue at stake,
jurisdictional redundancy can result in an emerging consensus-such
as occurred in the tobacco litigation 2'-or reflect deep social
disagreements. Rather than increasing accuracy, jurisdictional
redundancy offers an opportunity to examine the "kinds of problems
associated with systematic political authority."22
C Interest, Innovation, andIdeology
As proponents of centralization in civil procedure rightly note,
jurisdictional redundancy is expensive as an institutional structure and
costly to coordinate. It is important, therefore, to remind ourselves of
the difficulties created by centralized political authority. Cover
identified three areas where political considerations might be relevant
to jurisdictional choices: interest, innovation, and ideology. He
defined interest as the "self-interest of incumbent elites in a regime";
innovation as policies enacted by elites that "depart from traditional,
common cultural norms and expectations"; and ideology as "the more
or less unconsciously held values and ways of seeing the world,
reflected in the governing elites, which tend to serve and justify in
general and longrun terms the social order which the elites
dominate"''1
3
120. Cover, supranote 12, at 656.
121. On the history of the tobacco litigation, particularly its early failures, see Robert
L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING
POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 110-27 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 1993).
122. Cover, supa note 12, at 657.
123. Id.
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Jurisdictional redundancy matters in part because there remain
geographic differences that matter in our nation. As Cover suggested,
despite appearances of nationalization and an integrated economy, the
United States still retains local and state-based constituencies and
elites that differ from one another.'24 Our system of multiple state,
local, and federal lawmakers and corporate actors at once strives for
nationalization, occasionally reaches consensus, and nevertheless
remains in conflict. The observation that pluralism persists even
within an increasingly nationalized economy seems intuitively correct
in today's political climate which focuses on the differences between
"red" and "blue" states on numerous cultural and sometimes economic
grounds. Elites from different geographic areas differ from one
another in terms of ideology and interests. Class stratification and the
increasingly distant relationship between consumers and producers and
individuals and corporate groups in a global economy play a role in
institutional interactions and conflicts.
Conflicts may appear to diminish as federalizing doctrines such
as preemption take hold, but under the surface they continue. An
influx of lawsuits arising from the marketing of a drug, for example,
indicates resistance to the manner in which the federal government has
enacted, enforced, and overseen regulation. This resistance comes
from an elite consisting of plaintiffs' lawyers and consumer groups. A
different elite, that of defense lawyers and corporations, seeks to
control this area of regulation. These large-scale suits expose the
conflicts between institutions (courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies) and between political entities (federal, state, and local).'25
The lines drawn between these categories are complex and evolving.
1. Interest
Perhaps the most ink has been spilled addressing the question of
competing interests in mass litigation. These are usually understood as
what I shall call private interests: the interests of plaintiffs in obtaining
compensation or of defendants in avoiding liability. The line between
private and public is hard to draw and not always the appropriate lens
through which to view these questions. Compensation, for example,
could be characterized as a public or a private purpose of litigation
depending on whether its primary purpose is individual payment or
124. Id. at 657-58.
125. For a useful discussion of the relationship between the local, state, national, and
federal institutions in class actions, see Resnik, supra note 21.
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deterrence. 126 Nevertheless, I maintain the distinction for purposes of
discussion. The "private" interests referred to here play out in the
courts in procedural battles over jurisdiction, venue, and discovery, and
in the legislature over the rules that ought to govern these concepts.1
2
1
When "public" social interests are discussed in the scholarly literature,
they are usually taken for granted.1 28  It is important to remember,
however, that the parameters of this category of social interests are
driven by politics and ultimately ideology, and are therefore contested.
Economic analysis has provided many important insights into the
concern about the operation of private interests in mass litigation,
particularly with respect to the divergence between the interests of
lawyers representing large numbers of plaintiffs (or absent class
members) and those of the plaintiffs themselves.'29 Lawyers may be
tempted to trade off the interests of their clients as a group in order to
obtain a faster settlement and, perhaps, to increase their fees. The
concern engendered by the agent-principal problem in plaintiff-side
representation has been a staple of class action scholarship. This issue
plays out similarly in the context of aggregative litigation, as mass
cases are settled as a group or in classes.'3° If the proposed ALI rule
permitting lawyers to solicit agreement to settlements in advance were
adopted, the divergence of interests would be overtly the same in
aggregation as in the class context. In reality, that structural conflict
126. See, e.g, David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
'Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 900-02 (1984) (characterizing
the deterrence function of the tort system as a public function); William B. Rubenstein, On
What a 'Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2141
(2004) (discussing the relationship between deterrence and compensation).
127. For an excellent historical discussion of some of these issues, see generally
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2000); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(presenting a rigorous analysis of this phenomenon with respect to CAFA).
128. For an example of the use of the public/private distinction in this context, see
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive To
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 607 (1997).
129. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneutial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 889-90 (1987)
(discussing the "asymmetric stakes" in mass litigation).
130. See generally Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.YU. L. REv. 296 (1996)
(comparing class actions and other forms of aggregate litigation and finding similarities).
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already exists in "inventory" cases when lawyers are put in the position
to trade off the interests of some clients against others.'31
Centralization both serves some interests and creates others. For
example, multidistrict litigation has created networks of plaintiffs'
attorneys who communicate with one another, share strategies, and
sometimes pool resources.'32 If the plaintiffs' lawyers in charge of the
Plaintiff's Management Committee (PMC) do a good job, this can
benefit all the participants. But if there is a divergence of interests
between groups of plaintiffs, this can lead to internecine fighting.
Leading lawyers stand to gain both financially and in prestige from the
consolidation of power that aggregation enables and the ability to
leverage that power. Lawyers on both sides are repeat players in
aggregate litigation. As a result, the interest in centralization may
become entrenched, especially in particular areas of specialization
such as pharmaceutical products liability litigation.
It is important, however, not to forget the role of institutional
interests. Legislatures may sometimes have an interest in creating
rights that will be enforced by courts rather than by administrative
agencies, in order to make reforms more politically palatable.'33
Judges may wish to reduce their dockets by consolidating cases and
shifting resolution to private parties.'4 If groups of judges are
ideologically linked to certain political power elites, there is a concern
that they will decide cases according to their affiliation. As Thomas
Jefferson, who had reason to worry about combinations of judicial and
political power in the hands of a single bloc, explained: "But we all
know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps" and may be
tempted by bribery and misled "by a spirit of party, by a devotion to
the Executive or Legislative," and "[i]t is left therefore to the juries, if
they think the permanent judges are under any biass [sic] whatever in
131. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role Of Plaintiffs'
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1471 n.20 (1998).
132. See Stier, supra note 75, at 896 (describing the growing informal networks among
plaintiffs' lawyers in mass tort litigation).
133. See, e.g., R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and
European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 101, 102 (2006) (suggesting that to achieve
regulatory goals in a liberalized environment, policy makers rely more on private
enforcement).
134. I discuss this phenomenon and its implications in Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law
and Large Numbers Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383,
388-90 (2007).
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any cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the
fact.' 3
5
The overlap and allocation of jurisdiction between judge and jury
in the Bill of Rights, for example, was not only a matter of tradition or
natural rights, but a political artifact driven by local and state debtor
interests in conflict with the federal government's interest in repaying
British creditors.'36 In recent memory, the transfer of jurisdiction over
national class actions from state to federal courts seems to have been
driven by a hope that the federal courts will be more friendly to
defendants and a belief that state courts favored plaintiffs too
strongly.'37 Similarly, Rule 23(f), which permits interlocutory appeal of
class certification decisions, can be considered a form of strategic
choice created to curb the power of particular interests. Evidence
shows that appellate judges are more likely to reverse certification
decisions.' 38 This type of interest is more aptly described as "ideology,"
a concept addressed in the next section.'
Can multiplicity provide a counterpoint to the entrenchment of
interests represented by centralization? The existence of multiple
centers for litigation, as occurred in the Vioxx cases, could result in
multiple centers of power both in the court system and the plaintiff's
bar. The risk of collusion may be reduced by multicenteredness
because competition will make it more difficult for defendants to buy
off plaintiffs' counsel at the expense of the class. Compare multiple
multidistrict litigations (in state and federal court) with the class action.
Under certain conditions, the class action device can allow defendants
to purchase global peace at a reduced rate if they are able to negotiate a
class-wide settlement with a given class counsel. Global peace is
135. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), h7 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 363, 364 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
Jefferson's concerns may have been a product of his rivalry with Justice Marshall, a staunch
Federalist. For an excellent treatment of this relationship, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 146-209 (2001).
136. See Matthew P Harrington, The Economic Oigins of the Seventh Amendmen4
87 IOwA L. REv. 145, 169-76 (2001) (describing the role of the politics of debt before and
after the Revolution in the establishment of the jury right).
137. For a description of the lobbying efforts in CAFA, see Purcell, supr note 127.
138. There is evidence that appellate courts reverse certification decisions more often
than they affirm them and that some circuits are more inclined to reverse than others. See
Richard Freer, Interlocutory Review of ClassAction Certification Decisions: A Preliminary
Empiical Study ofFederal and State Experience, 34 W ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
139. Cover usefully presents interest as a continuum. Interests such as individual
financial gain are represented at one end of the spectrum. The "bonds of ideological
identification" which may drive some institutional interests are on the other end. Cover,
supra note 12, at 660.
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harder to obtain in the aggregation context, though not impossible, as
the Vioxx settlement illustrates.
Next consider the possible negative effects of informal
coordination between several multidistrict litigations. This can happen
when judges communicate with one another about the timing of
discovery and decisions regarding dispositive motions. These types of
strategic manipulations may lead to settlement. Instead of having
multiple centers of decision making, such coordination may result in
de facto centralization and the entrenchment of power in the hands of a
limited set of players. Such unchecked power opens up the potential
for abuse because settlements in aggregate litigation require no formal
approval. Perhaps this is why judges sometimes evaluate settlements
even in a nonclass setting. The perception is that parties will not agree
to settlements of which the presiding judge disapproves, even if the
judge lacks formal power over the settlement.'4°
Additional monitoring is the natural solution to the potential for
abuse created by centralization.'4' But monitoring is only as good as
the monitors themselves, which is why some scholars have focused
largely on incentive-based changes to the class action regime, and
particularly on attorney's fees.'42 In the multidistrict litigation setting,
the ability of litigants to strategically choose different forums to the
extent they can do so will not solve the problem of biased judges or
alter the incentives to reach a suboptimal settlement. Instead, it will
lead to different decisions in different courts and thereby provide
counterpoints to the bias of a particular set of judges or lawyers. If a
litigant believes that the judge in a particular forum is biased, the
ability to file or transfer the case to another forum to receive a fair
hearing is significant. ' This assumes, of course, that there is some
variation among judges in different aggregate settings.
Multiplicity is not a cure for the problems caused by the
prevalence of private interests in litigation. It merely destabilizes the
140. DVD: The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation: Bellwether Trials and Settlement
Devices (Tulane Law Review 2008) (statements by Judge Eldon E. Fallon) (on file with the
Tulane University School of Law Library).
141. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37
IND. L. Rv. 65, 106-08 (2003) (noting that scholars and judges have argued for increased
judicial monitoring to limit class action abuses).
142. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 59, at 424. For an innovative fee regime, see Alon
Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty Selection and Monitorfng of Class Counsel, 22
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 107-19 (2004) (proposing a system of auctioning off the right to
represent a class that included a fee structure imposing substantial penalties on class counsel,
thus guaranteeing loyalty).
143. SeeCover, supranote 12, at 661.
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ability of some interests to completely control the litigation. In this
way it is a weapon against control by particular interests. As Cover
explained in his consideration of the subject, "This structure is not in
general useful for the imposition of determinate solutions.... It is an
approach to dilemmas of suspicion and uncertainty, not a [formula] for
clear-cut answers.'""
2. Innovation
The ability of states to innovate new approaches to law is one of
the basic arguments in support of our federalist system. As Justice
Holmes lamented in Truax v Corrigan, "There is nothing that I more
deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the
absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, ... even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me .... ""
Or as Justice Brandeis famously explained, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."'  That
argument has not been a vigorous one since the New Deal.'47 This is
the case in part because increasing interdependence has reduced the
number of experiments that can be engaged in "without risk to the rest
of the country" to a very few.
The threat of instability in the national economy that may result
from competing legal regimes has been the subject of both substantive
legislation and procedural reform. Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine
Sharkey have shown that the application of jurisdictional doctrines has
centralized decision making in the federal government and federal
courts."'8 As these authors point out, centralizing cases in a particular
forum in the absence of a uniform law causes instability."'9 To resolve
144. Id at 662.
145. 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also David Marcus, Erie, the ClassAction FairnessAct, and Some Federalism
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1247, 1271 (2007)
(describing the Progressive preference for state rather than federal regulation and the reasons
therefore).
147. For a rich discussion of the decline of localism following the New Deal and the
potential for reinvigorating it, see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement,
Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L.
REv. 1011, 1013-19 (2005).
148. Issacharoff& Sharkey, supra note 56, at 1420.
149. Id. at 1429.
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this instability, courts may coordinate the substantive law within the
centralized forum."'
Centralization is not the only means for reaching consensus. In a
multicentered system, consensus may be reached through "confirma-
tory redundancy."'' When multiple sources of authority articulate the
same norms, those norms obtain additional power. The theory of
maturation of a mass tort is an example of the development of
confirmatory redundancy over time."' Bellwether trials are another
model for creating confirmatory redundancy in a collapsed time
frame.
But bellwether trials are not as good a tool for resolving cases
where substantial disagreement persists. If juries reach widely varying
results, then the averaging process will result in systematic wealth
transfer from the highest value cases to the lowest value cases. This
criticism assumes that the size of the verdict is related to the quality of
the case. If those plaintiffs most harmed would lose the most value in
the process of averaging, this outcome is indeed unfair. If the variance
is due to factors only tangentially related to entitlement, such as
preexisting prejudice against classes of claimants, then redistribution
may be more acceptable. The fairness of a bellwether trial procedure
will depend, therefore, on the degree of societal agreement on
outcomes and the effects of ideology on the decision-making process.
The problem with relying on confirmatory redundancy in many
cases is a lack of consensus. Disagreement, especially on issues of
social importance that cross state lines, is what drives the concerns
articulated by proponents of centralization. This disagreement is
unavoidable. And although centralization promises uniformity, it
cannot promise the best decisions. Consider for a moment the
regulation of pharmaceuticals. Ostensibly, pharmaceuticals are
regulated ex ante by the Food and Drug Administration. In recent
years, the FDA has increasingly come under fire for failing to regulate
and therefore permitting drugs to be administered in ways that cause
patients harm.53 This regulatory failure led to substantial numbers of
150. Id. at 1420.
151. Cover, supra note 12, at 674-75.
152. See McGovern, supra note 115, at 688-94.
153. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004) (recounting the FDA's failures). In an
investigative report, the Los Angeles Times found seven drugs that were approved by the
FDA posed risk to human life that far outweighed any potential benefit. David Willman,
How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A1; see also
ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE
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lawsuits. For instance, the harms caused by the diet drug Phen-Fen
resulted in 18,000 lawsuits.54  Some were transferred under the
auspices of the JPML.'" Other individual tort cases proceeded in state
courts. Yet other cases sought class certification in state and federal
court.16 The result of regulatory failure at the agency level, where the
greatest potential for centralization was to be had, led to large-scale
litigation around the same drug and a proliferation of cases in state and
federal courts brought on aggregated, class, and individual bases.
Ultimately, the Diet Drugs Litigation settlement ballooned to $20
billion and was heavily criticized.'57 At the same time, courts and
legislatures have expanded preemption doctrine to limit certain types
of claims in pharmaceutical litigation, further consolidating agency
power. 8 This litigation illustrates that centralized decision making is
as subject to capture and abuse as multicentered decision making.
Disagreement and inconsistency may also reflect the inherent
instability of economic and social life, rather than being its cause.
To say that neither centralization nor multiplicity guarantees good
policies tells us very little. The specific virtue of pluralism is that it
offers multiple solutions, increasing the chances of getting some
outcomes right. Cover called these multiple norms "nonconfirmatory
redundancy."'5 9  The problem with a state of nonconfirmatory
redundancy is in the purchase of variety. What are we to do with the
different results reached in different labs? 6'
DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001) (describing the events that led
to the DietDrugs litigation).
154. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
155. These were consolidated under MDL 1203. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. MDL 1203 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 6, 1998) (amended transfer order).
156. In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042, at *3 (describing a national medical
monitoring class action certified in MDL court, and medical monitoring class actions
certified in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia).
157. See Alison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and
Suggestions of Fraud Have Made Fen-Phen a Disaster of a Mass Tort, AM. LAW., Mar. 2005,
at 92, 94.
158. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-53 (2001) (holding
that "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims are preempted); Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., No. 2005-59499
(Tex. Dist. Apr. 20, 2007) (order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
and granting expedited appeal at 9) (holding that plaintiffs in Vioxx lawsuits may not assert
fraud on the FDA claims under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007(b)(1) (Vernon
2005), which permits plaintiffs to rebut a presumption against liability if a warning was
approved by the FDA if the plaintiff can show that the defendant misled the FDA).
159. Cover, supmnote 12, at 675.
160. "The social laboratory metaphor does not tell us how the results of 'experiments'
in one lab come to claim the attention and deliberative energies of another." Id at 676.
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One answer is to continue with plural decision making and hope
that a consensus emerges over time. Such consensus might emerge
because courts communicate with one another. Direct coordination of
decisions in multiple courts may work against pluralism. But
encouraging communication will permit courts to reevaluate decisions
and perhaps reach consensus. Multicentered litigation may, over time,
create "a density of experience that produces information quickly with
simultaneous, interactive effects of decision and environment."' 6'
Dialogue between courts could result in better decisions, in part
because dialogue helps judges determine what questions to ask in
addition to what answers to give.'62 A decision on electronic discovery
or the admissibility of expert testimony in a state court overseeing
aggregated cases, for instance, will be known to other courts
overseeing a set of similar cases. The one court may not necessarily
adopt the decision of the other (nor should it merely for the sake of
uniformity) but it could learn from that decision. Such near
simultaneous decision making could make second thoughts and
reevaluation more likely, and perhaps in so doing increase fairness to
litigants.
The balance between collaboration and independent judgment is
a delicate one. Due process requires judges to retain their
independence and permit litigants to be heard in the process of making
decisions. At the same time, paying attention to what other judges are
doing can provide counterpoints to the judge's own preconceptions and
increase the possibility of reaching the most just outcome.
3. Ideology
The term ideology as used here refers to the unarticulated
assumptions about the world adopted by different groups. 3  For
example, prominent scholars have shown that across a range of
controversial issues there are systematic differences in voting patterns
between federal appeals judges appointed by Democratic Presidents
161. Idat678.
162. This point was brought out at the Symposium in the remarks of the Honorable
Carol Higbee, a New Jersey trial judge in whose courtroom the New Jersey Vioxx cases were
consolidated. She described her positive interactions with Judge Eldon Fallon, the federal
MDL judge in the Vioxx cases. DVD: The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note
140 (statements by Judge Carol Higbee).
163. This is admittedly a rather simplistic view of ideology, a subject the immense
complexity of which is beyond the scope of this work. For the limited purpose of the thesis
of this Article, however, I think the reader will find that this simple definition suffices.
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and those appointed by Republican Presidents.'" Scholars of cultural
cognition have provided empirical evidence of differences of opinion
among individual members of various social groups.'65 These different
world views can cause mistrust and form the basis of social conflict
among these groups. Adjudication is one space where these social
conflicts are worked out. As Robert Cover explained, "[A]djudication
can always become a ritualized enactment of the epistemological
chasms between one class and another, one race and another, one
gender and the other; between different generations, different nations;
and between city and country, town and gown."'66 And, one might add,
in the context of many mass torts, between consumer and corporation.
Conflict can arise along many different lines within the court
system. For example, the decision to allocate decisions to the judge or
the jury in a given trial can be seen as a function of assumptions about
the abilities of lay jurors to understand complex information. There
may be differences in decisions of state and federal judges on the same
legal issues that arise out of different assumptions about the world
based on life experience, social status, or other factors. There may be
systematic differences, as well, between district and appellate court
judges in the federal or state court systems.
Consider first the judge and the jury. Judicial and jury functions
present an example of sequential redundancy. A judge may determine
that there are no material issues of fact in dispute on a motion for
summary judgment, thereby taking the power to determine those facts
away from the jury.'67 After a jury has reached its verdict, a judge may
164. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITIcAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17-46 (2006).
165. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the PeniNs of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (documenting differences of opinion regarding legally relevant facts
along cultural, ideological and other lines).
166. Cover, supra note 12, at 664. As Paul Schiff Berman explains, "[T]rials, with
their elaborate procedures and formal rules, create a mythic arena for expressing the great
tensions and moral battles of the community." Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs, and
Statues on TNal The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and
Inanimate Objects, 69 NYU. L. REv. 288, 292-93 (1994).
167. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:1, at 16 (3d ed. 2006). The fact/law distinction
is notoriously slippery. One might argue in response that because there are no disputes of
material fact, there is really nothing for the jury to decide. However, the very question of
whether there are disputes or not can be considered a question of fact. See Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153-61 (1970); Arthur R. Miller, ThePretrialRush toJudgment:
Are the "Litigaton Explosion," "'Liability Crisis, "andEfficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.YU. L. REv. 982, 1062 (2003) (discussing and
critiquing the fact/law distinction in the summary judgment trilogy).
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invoke the doctrine of remittitur to require that the plaintiff accept a
lower amount or proceed to a new trial.'68 Because trials are costly,
plaintiffs rarely opt to retry these cases,169 effectively permitting the
judge to dictate the verdict where she finds it is unreasonable.'70
Judges may also essentially determine case outcomes by their
evidentiary rulings. In cases where expert testimony is central to one
or the other party's case, the outcome of the case may hang on how the
judge exercises her "gatekeeping" function of determining admissi-
bility of expert testimony.' This observation is not limited to cases
involving scientific evidence. Recall that in the September 11th
Litgation, Judge Hellerstein ordered several of the bellwether cases to
be tried for damages first in order to assist the parties in reaching
settlement.' The judge's early ruling on a defendant's motion in
limine spurred many of the cases to settlement. Discovery orders may
also influence the outcome of a case, especially in light of the expense
of electronic discovery. Thus, judicial control of the pretrial phase of a
case is critical to its outcome. As we shall explore in a moment, this
168. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935) (upholding
remittitur); see also 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 160 (2d ed. 1995) (describing remittitur as "a
practice, now sanctioned by long usage, by which the court may condition a denial of the
motion for a new trial upon the filing by the plaintiff of a remittitur in a stated amount").
169. See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality ofRemittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 793 (2003) (presenting evidence that "plaintiffs
take the remittitur or settle in 98% of the cases in which a judge grants a remittitur").
170. The legal standard for remittitur under federal law is whether the jury award
"shocks the conscience." See, e.g., Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 E3d 149, 165 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that a compensatory damage award may be set aside if 'the award is so high
as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice' (quoting O'Neill v.
Krzeminski, 839 E2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1988))). However, federal judges sitting in diversity must
apply the standard dictated by state law, which may give the judges more power. See
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 425, 430-31 (1996) (requiring federal
courts to apply the more restrictive New York standard of whether the jury's award "deviates
materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
171. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993)
(requiring that only "good" scientific evidence should reach the jury); see also Edward K.
Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1265-67
(2007) ("[Tlhe Daubert regime requires that judges critically examine an expert's
methodology and conclusions with 'exacting standards."); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial
Judges-Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Thal Judge CriticallyAssess the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury Province To Evaluate the Credibility and
Weight of the Testimony, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (2000) (discussing the significance of
Daubertand arguing that reform of the judicial function is needed).
172. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (describing the procedural history
of In re September I lth Litigation).
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fact underscores the significance of centralizing power in transferee
courts.
The popular conception is that there is a difference between
judges and juries.' Large jury verdicts are often the subject of press
accounts and, in the case of punitive damages, increasingly the subject
of United States Supreme Court review.'74 Some think that jurors hold
a different set of assumptions and values than judges by virtue of the
fact that jurors are not members of a professional judicial class, are
mostly not trained as lawyers, and have different cultural and economic
backgrounds than most judges. Nevertheless, empirical evidence
indicates that jurors are at least as educated as the general population.'
Over the last fifty years, studies have consistently shown that judges
and juries agree on outcomes in civil cases most of the time.'"
The real differences may be between legislators and actors in the
judicial branch, including juries and judges. Consider the case of
Garza v Merck, tried in Texas state court.' 7 The jury reached a verdict
of $7 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive
damages. The judge remitted the punitive damages award to $1.6
173. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 584 (1998) (discussing this perception and showing that differences in
win rates between judges and juries are the product of case selection); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge. Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1124, 1126 (1992) (describing the differences between litigant perceptions and reality about
judges and juries).
174. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007) (holding that a
punitive damages award based in part on a jury's desire to punish the defendant for harm to
nonparties violated the Due Process Clause); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 415, 429 (2003) (holding that a $145 million punitive damages award (later
reduced to $25 million) was grossly excessive in light of a $2.6 million compensatory
damages award) (later reduced to $1 million); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
562-63, 580 (1996) (holding that a $4 million punitive damages award (reduced to $2 million
on appeal) was "grossly excessive" and violated the Due Process Clause). Exxon Shipping
Co. v Baker, No. 07-219, 2008 WL 2511219, at *4 (U.S. 2008), decided as this Article went
to press, raises similar issues under the common law.
175. See Hillel Y Levin & John W Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the
Jury Selecton Process 38 CONN. L. REv. 325, 328, 346-47 (2006) (presenting an empirical
study finding that Connecticut jurors are not less educated than the general population, and
perhaps are even better educated than the general population).
176. See VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 117 (1986) (citing a
study indicating that judges and juries agreed on an outcome seventy-eight percent of the
time, and that the remaining twenty-two percent of the time, their disagreement was balanced
between plaintiffs and defendants); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Pimitve
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743, 779 (2002) (presenting an
empirical study showing that juries and judges largely agree on punitive damages awards).
177. No. DL-03-94 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 21, 2006), rvvilNo. 04-07-00234-CV, 2008 WL
2037350 (Tex. App. May 14, 2008).
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million to bring the verdict in line with local statutory limits on
punitive damages. Perhaps the divergence was not between judge and
jury but the legislative and judicial branches. Given that the remittitur
was legislatively driven, perhaps the professional class and the rest of
the population in a given geographical area operate on a set of
assumptions that are not so different after all. We may see a
divergence of opinion on socially contested issues between legislative
and judicial institutions because juries are faced with a concrete case
whereas legislators deal in abstractions. The conflict between these
institutions seems to me necessary to stimulate a societal debate about
these important issues. It may also be that if there is a divergence
between jury verdicts and judicial decisions, disagreement exists
where the social conflict is most likely to arise, such as awarding
punitive damages or determining causation. Both of these questions
present significant social issues. It is not surprising that they might be
the subject of conflict.
If judges and juries mostly agree, does the jury add anything to
the adjudication process? The jury has what some have termed the
"pluralist" function of representing a cross section of the community.'78
Juries can be a microcosm of societal disagreements. Jury service can
lead to consensus through deliberation. Or it can lead to conflict, the
surfacing of insurmountable differences, and even a mistrial.
Moreover, juries in different jurisdictions may reach different results
from one another in very similar cases. It is difficult to measure these
differences, because the facts of even similar cases can differ. Local
factors, such as the extent to which the plaintiff is likeable or the
advocate more talented than average, can explain some differences. It
is nevertheless plausible to say that different juries may reach different
conclusions with regard to the same case if it were presented the same
way. These conclusions may, in turn, be the result of fundamental
differences between the juries as to basic assumptions about the world,
in other words, differences in ideology.
Multiple juries hearing similar cases present an instance of
synchronic redundancy. When jury verdicts in aggregate cases are
collected, they may yield an emerging consensus about liability and/or
damages. Or the verdicts may reflect substantial social conflict.
Recall the spread of the Vioxx verdicts at the time of settlement: six
verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, ten defense verdicts, and three cases
178. See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
125, 126-33 (describing the "pluralist ideal" for ajury's function).
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awaiting retrial.' Differences in state laws could account for some
divergence, but even cases tried in the same jurisdiction reached
widely varying results. The four New Jersey Vioxx trials were equally
split between substantial plaintiff's awards and defense verdicts.'8 ° Of
course, this split could mean many different things. But one potential
meaning is that society is undecided about basic issues of
responsibility for adverse outcomes in patients prescribed
pharmaceuticals.
The horizontal redundancy found in multiple juries and vertical
redundancy found in judicial and jury decision making may correct for
ideological bias by testing out premises in different forums. Divergent
outcomes in different forums may not be an example of mere error in
the sense of a failure to apply the law accurately to the facts at hand or
an incorrect finding of fact. Instead, divergence may represent
different ways of viewing the world and different assessments of value
based on cultural values and background assumptions.'8' Jury verdicts
will come out differently more often in cases where there is social
conflict over the issue presented. Judges and juries may differ more
often over issues where social conflict is at its apex. We should
therefore expect to see divergence most when redundancy is at its most
useful.
Differences in decision making between state and federal judges
may also be the product of ideology. One empirical study appears to
show that "win" rates for plaintiffs were lower in cases that had been
removed to federal court than in cases that remained in the initially
filed state court.'82 Another showed that federal judges were more
likely to deny certification of class actions, although state and federal
179. See cases cited supra notes 106-107.
180. See cases cited supra notes 106-107.
181. Cultural historians have convincingly shown that ideas about value change over
time. See VVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE
OF CHILDREN (1994) (describing the changing views of the value of children over the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries); see also Bassett, supra note 97, at 394 ("The notion of
,one proper result' is an erroneous premise in light of the potential differences in the
applicable law, the vagaries of fact investigation and discovery, the potential for lawyer error
or poor tactical choices, and the necessity in fully litigated cases for formal factfinding-
factual determinations that shape both liability and damage outcomes.").
182. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 607. This study found that removal
reduced plaintiff's win rate by approximately fifty percent. In nonremoved diversity cases
plaintiff's win rate was seventy-one percent whereas in removed cases it was thirty-four
percent. The study attempted to disaggregate the case selection effect from the forum
selection effect, and found that when controlling for the case selection effect, plaintiffs win
rate was still eleven percent lower, a reduction attributable to forum effects. The study was
based on an assumption of a win rate of fifty percent. Id. at 592-607.
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judges were equally likely to certify a class.8 The reason for these
differences may be that state courts will sit on certification motions,
leaving them in limbo, whereas certification is more often adjudicated
and appealed in the federal system. There is empirical evidence that
state judges are less likely than federal judges to entertain preemption
claims, although these claims are gaining some traction in state
courts.84 These studies seem to support the contention that there are,
in some cases, differences between the treatment of similar cases in
state and federal court.
Not all of these differences can be attributed to different
procedural regimes, as many states have adopted the basic language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as well as other aspects of the
Federal Rules. Some of these differences between state and federal
judges are likely due to ideological factors. Assume for the moment
that case selection is not the deciding factor in these divergent
outcomes, recognizing that this cannot be conclusively proven. If there
is an ideological divergence between state and federal judges, for
example, then jurisdictional redundancy will promote fairness by
limiting the ability of a particular group to wield power over litigants.
V How MUCH MULTIPLICITY CAN A SYSTEM TOLERATE?
Our national commitment to jurisdictional pluralism and to
intrainstitutional competition is embedded in the United States
Constitution, which creates two competing court systems with
jurisdiction over the same cases and retains power to the local civil jury
within the federal system.'85 Our system of adversarial adjudication
ensures that litigants will utilize jurisdictional redundancy to their
advantage. The question facing judges, scholars, and policy makers
183. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATrORNEY REPORTS ON
THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADViSORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING A
CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS 4-5, 7-8, 18, 29-31 (2004), available at http://www.fjc.
gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/amort02.pdf/$file/amortO2.pdf. The study shows that defense
attorneys believe that in class action cases the federal forum is more beneficial to their
clients' interests and that they remove cases based on state law to the federal courts for that
reason. Id. at 4.
184. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action. FDA Regulatory Preemption in
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1017-20 (2007)
(discussing an unpublished study and potential explanation for differences between state and
federal courts, including closer relationship between federal courts and federal administrative
agencies such as the FDA).
185. See U.S. CONST. art. III (creating inferior federal courts and diversity
jurisdiction); id. amend. VII (preserving a civil jury right).
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now is not whether we will have such a system, but how much
pluralism we are willing to tolerate. Lately the most prevalent view
has been that pluralism ought to be minimized in favor of
centralization. In light of this movement, the question might also be
put another way: how much centralization should we permit in a
pluralist society?
A. Weighing Costs and Benefits
The value of multicentered litigation is that it preserves
competition between institutions and recognizes the legitimacy of
different points of view. As a result, society retains access to multiple
visions of what constitutes beneficial social policy, alternative
outcomes with respect to contested social issues, and the potential for
rethinking assumptions and strongly held ideals that may, on reflection,
be flawed. Multicentered litigation promotes innovation and critical
thinking, two important criteria for creating good policies. Finally,
multiplicity prevents error from taking hold.
Centralization has many benefits as well. Courts are, or claim to
be, strapped for resources, and many cases are repetitious or routine.'86
In some cases, uniformity is necessary to protect important
governmental powers and interests, although this too comes at a cost.'87
Producers in a global economy seek legal certainty and consistency,
values that cannot be achieved in a legal regime that allows different
jurisdictions to reach different outcomes.' Finally, centralization may
limit litigants' ability to engage in procedural and jurisdictional
manipulation. By contrast, multiple forums can permit reverse
auctions in class actions and other strategic manipulations of the rules.
How can courts weigh the relative value of these costs and
benefits? Whether centralization or multicenteredness is the best
approach can only be determined in context. When entities such as the
JPML have the discretion to decide whether to centralize, they should
consider the following factors: (1) the extent of underlying substantive
disagreement, (2) the costs of inconsistency, and (3) the role of
political power in the dispute.
186. See Galanter, supm note 68, at 1132-34 (presenting evidence that calls
assumptions about increasing docket size into question).
187. But see Amanda Frost, (Over)valuing Unifonmity, 94 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2008) (debunking arguments in favor of uniformity and arguing that courts should avoid
expending resources to standardize federal law merely for the sake of achieving uniformity).
188. But cf Berman, supr note 20, at 1162 (discussing and critiquing attempts to
"solve" problem of hybridity through harmonization).
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First, to what extent is there disagreement as to the substance of
the law? If there is substantial disagreement, then allowing
multicentered litigation will be valuable in the development of the law.
If there is largely consensus, centralization is more appropriate and
perhaps even desirable to prevent the "outlier" problem. Second, are
the questions to be decided of the type that inconsistent adjudication
will result in substantial harm to the litigants or the legal system? If
inconsistent adjudication will cause significant harm, centralization is
more appropriate than in a case where inconsistent adjudications will
not have far-reaching negative consequences. Third, is there a
legitimate concern that judicial or jury decisions in the particular legal
area will be influenced by ideology in ways that will be unfair to
particular sets of litigants? Ideological tilt will favor multiplicity in
order to prevent error from taking hold and to mitigate the problems of
political authority.
To understand how these factors might be applied in practice, let
us consider two hard cases. These cases are hard because they present
controversial substantive questions and conflicting values. The factors
described above will either help resolve these conflicts in favor of a
single forum or show that the continuation of these conflicts is in fact
desirable. The three-factor test may not resolve the value conflict that
is at the heart of the debate about centralization, but it brings to the
surface what is really at stake in eliminating redundancy. In so doing,
the test forces judges and policy makers to consider the costs of
centralization and the benefits of pluralism.
B. FDA Preemption ofState Failure To Warn Claims
Preemption is a controversial issue that is the subject of
substantial debate. Several cases considered by the Supreme Court
this term present this issue, though it is unlikely to be definitively
resolved soon.'89 In Wamer-Lambert Co. v Kent an equally divided
189. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam);
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-11 (2008); Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107,
6-34, 944 A.2d 179, 183-94 (2006), cert. grantea 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (No. 06-1249).
For some different views on the issue, see David Kessler & David Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA's Efforts To Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing against FDA preemption); Peter Schuck, FDA Preemption of
State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing in favor of preemption with some caveats); Catherine Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption. An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2008) (proposing an agency reference model whereby courts will look to
agencies to provide data as to whether preemption is appropriate).
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Court affirmed the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which had held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) does not preempt product liability claims under Michigan law
against drug manufacturers that allegedly defrauded the FDA.'" The
case has no precedential value except in the Second Circuit, from
whence it came.'91 There is a circuit split on this contentious issue of
law, public policy, and public health that the Court failed to resolve.
As a result, failure to warn cases brought in some circuits are
preempted and will be dismissed (if they are brought at all) and cases
brought in other circuits will be permitted to go forward.'92
Because tort suits arising out of the use of pharmaceuticals often
come in large numbers, it is likely that numerous suits arising out of
similar facts and bringing these types of claims will be brought.
Sooner or later, the JPMIL will be asked to transfer these many cases to
a single court. Then the Panel will be faced with a choice of where to
transfer the cases: to the circuit that has ruled in favor of preemption
and would dismiss the claims, to the circuit that has ruled against
preemption and would let the claims go forward, or to a circuit that has
yet to rule on the issue.'93 The Panel's choice will determine what
happens to the cases because the transferee court is empowered to
apply the law of its own circuit to all pretrial rulings, theoretically
including motions to dismiss."
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, the case that articulated the
rule that the transferee court apply the law of its own circuit, then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave three reasons for allowing the
transferee court's law to apply: (1) "[a]pplying divergent
interpretations of the governing federal law to plaintiffs, depending
solely upon where they initially filed suit, would surely reduce the
efficiencies achievable through consolidated preparatory proceedings";
(2) "because there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal
law, the attempt to ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations
190. Kent, 128 S. Ct. at 1168.
191. SeePlautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,215 n.1 (1995).
192. Compare Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 E3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the defendant), with Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467
E3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding a case for further proceedings), affd sub nom. Kent,
128 S. Ct. at 1168.
193. This discussion is inspired by the analysis of Mark Herrmann and Jim Beck. See
Drug and Device Law, There Ought To Be a Law (An Odd Implication of Kent),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/03/there-oughta-be-law-odd-implication-of.html
(Mar. 5, 2008 7:42 EDT).
194. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 E2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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simultaneously is inherently self-contradictory"; and (3)the parties
could always seek review by the Supreme Court for an authoritative
and final interpretation.'95 That last condition, of course, was not met
in this case because the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide
and instead preserved the circuit split. After In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster, at least one district court has reviewed the issue and held that
questions that are not "merely pretrial" issues should be decided based
on the law of the tansferor court.'96 The judge explained, "[N]either
party should be prejudiced in preparing for trial because the case was
removed and transferred to another district in a different circuit."' 97 But
there has been no final pronouncement on the question of which
circuit's law applies to cases transferred under the auspices of the
JPML.
Consider how the three-factor test might apply if the Panel were
to consider transferring cases raising state law failure to warn claims.
First, to what extent is there disagreement as to the substance of the
law in this case? This is a situation where the substance of the law is
hotly contested. Disagreement is substantial, and the issue is one of
significant importance to patients, drug companies, and the federal
government. The disagreement at its root is about important structural
issues: to what extent will states have the power to regulate
pharmaceutical companies? It also implicates economic issues, such
as to what extent permitting states to regulate this national industry
damages the national economy.
Second, is the question to be decided such that inconsistent
adjudication will result in substantial harm to the litigants or the legal
system? Arguably the preemption question is not of the type that
substantial harm would be caused by inconsistent adjudication. In
fact, our legal system is quite able to tolerate multiple outcomes in the
same type of case in different states. If substantial harm was
forthcoming, it is likely that the Supreme Court would have found a
way to agree on a uniform principle. Inconsistency is an
inconvenience for defendants and some plaintiffs, but it is unlikely to
do substantial harm to the national economy. We know this because
the circuits have been operating under different rules for some time.
195. Idat 1175.
196. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 ER.D. 185,
191 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (applying the law of the transferor court to the question of
certification under Rule 23(b)(3)).
197. Id at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Finally, is there a legitimate concern that judicial decisions will be
influenced by ideology in ways that will be unfair to either side with
respect to this issue? There is no clear answer to the question in this
case. The circuit split in itself points to ideological differences.
Where, as here, the direction of the law is contested and subject to
widely differing interpretations, the unarticulated assumptions of
judges about the usefulness of regulation, pharmaceutical innovation,
and the legitimacy of the jury system will more likely influence the
decision-making process. Therefore, it seems possible that ideology
would influence the outcome if the cases were to be transferred to a
single court in a circuit that had yet to rule on the preemption issue.
This would be unfair to some litigants.
This analysis militates in favor of permitting the litigation to
proceed in multiple forums. But cases need not remain scattered all
over the country where they were filed. Instead, the JPML could
decide to allocate cases to regional centers. Cases that are brought in
circuits adopting preemption may be transferred to a single region and
dismissed or they will not be brought at all. Cases brought in circuits
rejecting preemption will be permitted to proceed, having been
transferred to a single court within one of those circuits. Finally, cases
brought in circuits that have yet to decide the matter may be
consolidated in a third region. This pluralist solution would not
resolve the problem of forum shopping, but it would provide a modus
vivendito accommodate concerns about political authority and reflect
the very real social differences expressed in the appellate court
opinions.
C The NSA Liigation
Another conflict of values is illustrated by a particularly difficult
recent set of cases, the litigation arising out of allegations that
telecommunications companies illegally wiretapped individuals, often
referred as the National Security Agency [NSA] Litiation.'98 Thi
litigation illustrates the simultaneous need for and costs of
centralization and uniformity. Some of these wiretapping cases were
brought in state court and others in federal court. The state court
actions consisted of claims under state privacy law rather than any
federal law. In order to consolidate all cases relating to the underlying
facts-the wiretapping of individuals by a number of telecommunica-
198. 444 E Supp. 2d 1332 (J.PM.L. 2006) (transferring cases to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California as MDL 1791).
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tion companies-in MDL 1791, the state cases would have to be
removed to federal court. The state plaintiffs claimed that their cases
were not properly removed to federal court because, under the well-
pleaded complaint rule, their claims were purely state law claims.'99
The federal court found that the state secrets privilege "requires
dismissal if national security concerns prevent plaintiffs from proving
the prima facie elements of their claim. 2 ° For that reason, the court
held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate. The court ruled that the
scope of the privilege is a substantive federal issue and there is 'a
serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be
inherent in a federal forum.""'2 ' All related cases were transferred to
the Northern District of California.
The three-factor test helps us determine whether pluralism or
centralization is the better approach for responding to this litigation.
First, to what extent is there disagreement as to the substance of the
law in this case? Like the preemption scenario, the issues underlying
the NSA Litgaton are contentious and overtly politicized. The
disagreement here has not resulted in a circuit split providing direct
proof of the disagreement. The public debate on the issue makes clear,
however, that the underlying question of when the state secret privilege
should apply, as well as the extent to which private companies should
be held liable for complying with these governmental orders, is hotly
contested.
Second, is the question to be decided such that inconsistent
adjudication will result in substantial harm to the litigants or the legal
system? In this case, inconsistent decisions may result in substantial
harm to the government and the public interest because of the national
security risks in revealing the information claimed to be privileged.
Furthermore, there is a risk that if litigation is brought in multiple
forums, one outlier judge will permit access to materials that other
judges deemed privileged. That proverbial bell could not be unrung.
On the other hand, the safety valve of an appeal, combined with the
fact that it is unlikely that an outlier decision would be upheld, weighs
against finding substantial harm, at least with respect to the federal
199. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 483 F Supp. 2d 934, 937
(N.D. Cal. 2007).
200. Id. at 942.
201. Id. at 943 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 313 (2005)). Although the federal government had not yet intervened at the time of
the decision, it had declared its intention to intervene and assert the state secret privilege.
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courts. It would be reasonable for a court to find that inconsistency
could cause substantial harm in a case such as this one.
Finally, is there a legitimate concern that judicial decisions will be
influenced by ideology in ways that will be unfair to either side with
respect to the substantive issues at stake? This is a substantial concern
in a case such as this, because of the political nature of the question at
hand. This fact is evidenced by the decision to remove the cases to
federal court despite the fact that removal seems to violate the well-
pleaded complaint rule. State court judges could be more skeptical of
the federal government's motives and more concerned about the
potential for using the state secret privilege to chill legitimate
litigation.
The facts of this case tilt in favor of centralization largely on the
basis of the second factor. Disagreement must come in the political
area, rather than the judicial one, because of the difficulty caused by
inconsistent judgments on the privilege issue. This conclusion
favoring centralization raises serious political concerns. The outcome
of a single court's ruling on the state secret privilege will be dispositive
of these cases. Applying the privilege will prevent the plaintiffs from
obtaining any discovery, leaving them with no proof, and thus will
require dismissal of their claims. The court's ruling on this pretrial
motion could deny the only available opportunity for the public to
learn what its government is doing and for the plaintiffs' case to be
decided on the merits. On the other hand, the possibility of an appeal
mitigates this concern somewhat.
VI. CONCLUSION
Litigation has many purposes: to resolve disputes, make litigants
whole, create norms, and force information. Information is power.
The ability to force information or to curtail its dissemination is a
critical component of a group or government's ability to maintain the
existing power structure or destabilize it.2"2 For this reason, it is risky
for a society to place such power in the hands of a single court. In a
case such as the NSA Ligaton, silence may be advisable given the
national security issues at stake. To centralize this decision, however,
202. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constaints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.YU. L. REV. 354, 355-58 (1999)
(arguing that the increase in privatization of information reinforces the existing power
structure and hinders society's information production and exchange process); Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786-87 (1987) (arguing that regulation of informa-
tion, whether by the government or new agencies, limits political debate).
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requires a lot of faith in the transferee court to make the right decision.
Centralization of decisions such as these may result in fundamental
unfairness and the perpetuation of constitutional violations by the
government and private entities.
The risk of centralization is silence. By contrast, pluralism and
the institutional conflict that it permits may spur either a useful
conversation or a cacophony. Having a real debate over social issues
on which there is no consensus requires a variety of voices of
authority. This means that overlapping institutions remain in conflict
while a consensus is developed. Inevitably, it will be the socially
contentious issues that are worth litigating.

